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This thesis compares lifetime incomes of Navy and major
airline pilots. Regression analysis of actual 1983 pilot
wages predicts average wages as a function of pilot
seniority. Regression results adjusted for post-1983 wage
changes are used to forecast thirty-year pilot earnings.
The average military benefit of tax-free income and allow-
ances are computed. Three Navy salaries are compared
against a weighted-average airline salary. Comparisons are
made of earnings and retirement benefits, using a discount
rate of five percent.
Two Navy pilot career choices at age thirty are assumed:
1. The pilot remains in the Navy, retires at age forty-
two, then joins an airline, retiring at age sixty.
2. The pilot joins an airline and retires at age sixty.
My finding is that a Navy pilot will maximize his income
by remaining in the military until retirement, and then
flying with an airline. The present value of Navy pay
exceeds airline earnings by three to six percent.
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INTRODUCTION
If we are concerned with the readiness of our forces
worldwide today--and we surely are—nothing is more
important than to stem the exodus of our trained profes-
sionals.
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward [ Ref . 1: p. 3]
The retention rates for aircraft pilots in the Navy have
fluctuated widely. These trends are highly correlated to
the pilot-hiring cycles of the major airlines. x During
calendar years 1978-79 and again during 1984-85 the resigna-
tion rates of Navy pilots dramatically increased during
airline hiring cycles. Dr. Samuel Kleinman, in his research
on Navy pilot retention [Ref. 2], found that:
1. Pilot retention increases when commercial airline
employment declines.
2. Navy pilot retention rates decline by eight to ten
percent when airlines begin a moderate hiring cycle.
3. Pilot retention is responsive to the difference
between military and civilian pilot pay. The retention
response to pay was highest among those pilots just
completing their initial service obligation.
4. The Navy loses five pilots for every three Navy pilots
hired by the airlines.
Increases in pilot resignations above planned levels
create problems for the Navy, manpower planners and indi-
vidual pilots. The Navy' s economic loss is in excess of one
million dollars to train each replacement pilot. 2 Navy
manpower planners assigning veteran pilots to new jobs lose
flexibility. Many officers' job and location preferences can
x Major airlines are defined by the Department of Labor
as having gross yearly earnings of one billion dollars.
Major airlines pay pilots the highest available salaries.
2 It costs on average $1,000,000 and two years to provide
basic pilot training to an officer. Additional costs are
incurred to provide sufficient combat training to achieve
productivity.
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not be met. Pilots become less satisfied with Navy careers.
More pilots decide to resign.
Why do Navy pilot resignations increase when airline
hiring increases ? After all, the Navy offers exciting
careers, advanced training, and world-wide travel. MONEY
magazine lists the Navy as one of the top-ten organizations
to work for in the United States [ Ref . 3]. Pilots receive
high salaries. Congress has increased pay for the military
in general and for Navy pilots in particular. A series of
pay raises and bonus programs authorized since 1979 places a
Navy Lieutenant Commander in the top nine percent of the
nation's wage earners [Ref. 4].
Resigning pilots list "excessive family separation" as
their most common reason for leaving the Navy. Navy pilots
spend months at sea separated from their families. Working
conditions at sea are much more demanding and stressful than
conditions on land. Pilots often work for weeks with little
rest. 3 This stressful environment during peacetime is unique
to the Navy; this may explain why Navy pilot resignation
rates exceed those of the Air Force.
The more hours a person works the more valuable increas-
ingly scarce leisure time becomes. Therefore, a worker must
be paid more to be induced to work additional hours. But,
in the military, pilots' salaries are based on seniority and
rank, not on hours worked. As work demands increase and
leisure time decreases, Navy pilots may perceive inadequate
monetary rewards to balance their complaints of "excessive
family separation. "
Pilots leaving the Navy will seek a career which
increases their leisure time without decreasing earnings.
But a pilot seeking a new career will find that most jobs
3A Navy pilot is a Naval Officer first and a pilot
second. A Navy unit is self-supporting. Besides flying,
pilots manage maintenance, planning, and administrative
groups.
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pay less than the Navy. For example the average middle- level
civilian manager earned $ 34,210 in 1985 or about twenty- two
percent less than a thirty-year old Navy pilot [ Ref . 5].
Many pilots believe an airline career offers an optimum
solution. Airlines are perceived to offer increased career
earnings and leisure time. Past studies conclude that pilot
retention is related to the differences pilots perceive
between their own military salaries and published airline
salaries. A problem is that Navy pilots considering a
career change have difficulty determining their true prob-
able airline earnings. Pilots read examples of maximum
airline salaries presently earned by thirty-year veteran
pilots or a wage average for all pilots. Yearly average
airline salaries and future earning projections are not
available. Lacking average wage information, pilots can not
make an informed economic decision between an airline or
military career.
The airline industry is rapidly changing following its'
deregulation in 1978. Today, airline wages are generally
decreasing. Airline executives argue that the equilibrium
for a top pilot pay could be as low as $65,000 in current
dollars, 42 % below average pay for ALPA members [Ref. 6: p.
127] . Past perceptions based on maximum pay estimates are
no longer valid.
Almost all Navy pilots believe that an airline career
will give them higher earnings then a Navy career. However
the Navy pilot's perception of high airline wages in rela-
tion to military pay is flawed. Recent increases in Navy
earnings, including a $ 36,000 bonus paid to many pilots,
and decreased airline salaries have changed the pay ratio.
Moreover, most Navy pilots underestimate their own gross
income. 4 Pilots seem to equate their net pay to gross pay.
4 Without exception, officers questioned by the author
under-estimated their gross yearly income. Seventy-two Navy
pilots under-estimated their gross earnings by $ 1,340 to
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Gross Navy pay is decreased by federal, state and social
security taxes. Pay is also decreased by up to $ 13,246
yearly for an officer's housing allowances ( BAQ and VHA) if
government housing is provided. Additionally many officers
have not worked professionally in the civilian economy. They
have not been exposed to civilian deductions from gross
income, including union dues. The result is that officers
making a career decision may actually be comparing military
net pay to airline maximum gross pay.
This thesis has four objectives:
1. To determine a thirty year old pilot's expected yearly
income from the major airline industry over a thirty
year career.
2. To determine the gross income of the same thirty year
old Navy pilot if he remains in the Navy and thenjoins an airline after retirement.
3. To compute retirement benefits for alternative careers
one and two.
4. To compare the two lifetime income flows.
Comparisons are made using present values and assuming a
discount rate of five percent. Airline retirement at age
sixty is assumed. Pilots are assumed to live until age 77.
6
(the average life span of a pilot). Methodologies and terms
will be explained, along with discussion of assumptions and
findings.
A. EXPLANATION OF PRESENT VALUE
The five percent discount rate used to compute the
present value of pilot's incomes is based on people's
perception of the future. Nominal interest is the common
term for the amount we are paid for a borrower's use of our
money. Nominal interest is composed of real interest and
the expected rate of inflation. Inflation is the yearly
erosion of money's purchasing power. When inflation is ten
percent, $ 1. 10 is required a year from now to purchase the
14,000. The average officer underestimated income by
6,800.
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same amount as $ 1.00 will buy today. Lenders expect
nominal interest to protect the buying power of their loaned
funds. They also expect a real rate of return, after infla-
tion, for foregoing current consumption. The real rate of
interest always equals the nominal rate minus the expected
inflation rate, and is independent of the rate of inflation.
Nominal Interest = Real Interest + Rate of
Inflation (eqn 1.1)
The discount rate of five percent used in this study is
based on people's perception of the real rate of interest.
Dr. Harry Gilman [ Ref . 7] found that people foregoing
current consumption expect to be rewarded between four and
six percent. Therefore the average, five percent, is used
in this study.
As inflation changes, the real interest rate remains
constant causing a direct change to nominal interest. For
this reason a constant five-percent may be used over a
thirty year period.
The process of making pilots' wages received yearly over
thirty years comparable to today's dollars is called
discounting. Discounting is similar to compounding interest
into the future. Today's present value of tomorrow's wage
is given in equation 1. 2 . A $ 50,000 pilot's wage received
ten years in the future is equal to $ 30,695.66 today. 5
Present Value of Wage Received= { Wage Received/( 1. 00 +
Real Interest Rate)] raised to future year t (eqn 1.2)
5 $ 50,000 / ( 1.00 + .05) 10 = $ 50,000 / 1.63
$ 30,695. 66.
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When computing the present value of a series of wages
each year's wage is computed separately and then summed.
Wages are assumed to be paid in full at the beginning of
each year. Therefore the discount 't' of the first year





This chapter reviews the military compensation system,
specifically those elements that determine Navy pilot pay.
This review is necessary for comparing military and airline
career incomes.
The present military compensation system has evolved
since WWII. Compensation now consists of pays, allowances,
and benefits based on a member's pay grade (rank), years-of-
service (seniority), and special skills. Military compensa-
tion is paid bi-monthly as a salary, rather than based on
hours worked or on individual productivity. The military
compensation system is usually broken down into the
following categories: (1) regular military compensation, (2)
pays and allowances, and (3) other compensation elements
[ Ref . 8 : section one]
.
B. PAYS AND ALLOWANCES
Regular military compensation (RMC) is defined in U.S.
Code Title 37 as the combination of basic pay, basic allow-
ance for quarters (BAQ), basic allowance for subsistence
(BAS) and the tax advantage that accrues because these two
allowances are not taxable.
1. Basic Pay
Basic pay is the primary compensation received by
all military personnel. Every member of the military is
entitled to the continuous receipt of basic pay while on
active duty. Basic pay rates are determined by an officer's
pay grade and length of service in the military. For this
study, basic pay was computed for Fiscal Year 1986 ( Oct 1,
1985 to Sept 30, 1986). Computations were made for Navy
officers in pay grades 0-3 (Lieutenant), 0-4 (Lieutenant
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Commander), and 0-5 (Commander). Length-of- service is
comparable to civilian seniority. This study assumes that
all officers who reach the end of their initial service
obligations, where a decision to remain in the military will
be made, will have eight years length of service. 6 It is
also assumed that the officer will retire upon reaching
twenty years of active service. Promotions to Lieutenant
Commander and to Commander are assumed.
Increases in basic pay automatically occur at promo-
tion and at designated longevity steps. Longevity step
increases are designed to recognize additional experience
;
and occur at each even-numbered year for completed years-of
service from six through eighteen. Promotion to Lieutenant
Commander usually occurs between nine and eleven years: this
study assumes ten years. Commanders are promoted between
fifteen to seventeen years of commissioned service; this
i
study assumes sixteen years 7 [ Ref . 9]. Promotion timing
depends on the qualifications of the individual officer and
the manpower needs of the Navy. If officers have skills that
are in short supply, promotion rates tend to increase to
fill required job vacancies. 8
6 Length-of-service is computed from a pay-based-entry-
date. A service member's seniority for pay purpose begins
when a person contracts to enter the military. Seniority
for retirement includes only time spent on active duty.
This results in credited length-of-service for pay purposes
often being slightly longer for many individuals than length
of active service used to calculate retirement credits.
Officers receive approximately two years of flight training
prior to becoming pilots. A five-year service obligation is
incurred by each new pilot following training. The earliest
a pilot may leave the Navy is therefore the seventh year of
service, at the earliest age of twenty-nine.
7Using the earlier promotion points of nine and fifteen
years would bias income towards the Navy. Those officers
promoted and paid prior to ten and sixteen years will have a
higher income then in this study
8 Pilots have a high promotion rate. Over the past six
years about ninety percent who remain on duty are promoted
to Lieutenant Commander. Eighty percent are promoted to
Commander. These rates vary yearly.
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Adjustments to the basic pay rate levels are set
annually by Congress. Congress intends for military wages
to grow at the same rate as wages in the private sector. 9
Recent pay increases have been about three to four percent.
Table 1 lists officer monthly basic pay for pay grades 0-3,
0-4, and 0-5.
TABLE : 1
OFFICER BASIC . PAY TABLE






Under 2 $ 1,617.30 $ 1,740.30 $ 2,064. 60
2 1,808. 10 2,119. 20 2,424. 60
3 1,932. 90 2,260. 50 2,592. 00
4 2, 138. 70 2,260. 50 2,592. 00
6 2,241. 00 2,302. 50 2,592. 00
8 2,321. 70 2,404. 20 2,592. 00
10 2,447. 10 2,568. 00 2,670. 60
12 2,568. 00 2,712. 60 2,814. 00
14 2,631. 30 2,836. 20 3,002. 70
16 2,631. 30 2,960. 70 3,227. 10
18 2,631. 30 3,042. 60 3,412. 50
20 2,631. 30 3,042. 60 3,515. 70
Source: Navy Pay Manual
2. Basic Allowance for Quarters
Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) is the cash
allowance provided to an officer who does not live in
adequate government housing. An officer, upon reporting to
a new duty station, may have the option of living in
9 The All-Volunteer Army requires sufficient military pay
to attract and retain required manpower. If military pay
falls too far behind the civilian sector, military manpower
shortages become acute. Congress is forced to consider pay
increases or a draft to correct the manpower problem.
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government or in private housing. 10 If an officer lives in
government housing, all BAQ payments due him are withheld in
return for housing. Additionally, all utility expenses in
government quarters for water, electricity, and gas are paid
for or provided by the government at no added expense to the
officer. Otherwise the officer lives in private housing and
receives BAQ.
Due to the shortage of government housing and the
tax advantage of home ownership, 11 many officers choose to
purchase or rent housing and receive BAQ. Table 2 lists BAQ
pay tables for FY 1986.
TABLE 2
OFFICER BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS






0-3 $ 355. 80 $ 433. 50
0-4 439.50 519. 90
0-5 479. 40 568. 80
Source: Navy Pay Manual
1
"Officers may be required to live in government housing
if units are available or at overseas locations where living
off-base is prohibited.
^Officers, as well as private citizens, may deduct
interest and some other housing expenses from their gross
income for tax purposes. Since military personnel receive a
tax-free allowance to cover some of these housing expenses,
they receive a double' tax savings.
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3. Variable Housing Allowance
In 1980 Congress enacted legislation implementing
the Variable Housing Allowance (VHA). VHA was begun in
recognition of the rapid increase of housing costs in
selected areas of the United States, such as Hawaii and
California. If an officer lives in government housing, all
VHA payments due him are withheld in return for housing.
VHA rates are determined by an annual survey of
housing costs throughout the United States. VHA varies with
the actual cost of housing and utility costs experienced by
military personnel of various pay grades in a particular
local area. The end result is that the combination of BAQ
and VHA ideally equals the housing costs experienced by the
average officer in a local area.
A survey was made of local VHA rates where a Naval
Aviator can expect to live during a career. These rates
vary from $ 86. 55 for a Lieutenant stationed in Pensacola,
Florida to $ 535. 06 for a Commander in Barbers Point,
Hawaii. Typical VHA rates and averages are shown in Table
3 . No attempt was made to weight the average VHA paid in
relation to the number of pilots stationed at each of the
selected bases. Since the majority of pilots are stationed
in high-cost areas on the seacoast, rather than low cost
areas, the true average VHA rate received is higher than
shown in Table 3 .
Prior to October, 1985 a program known as "rent-
plus" paid officers stationed in high-cost overseas loca-
tions more than the VHA rates now in effect.
*
z Payments are
made to cover an officer's rent or mortgage payment, average
utility expenses, and moving-in, moving-out expenses, with a
maximum limit placed on payments. Officers under this
program prior to October 1986 will continue to receive the
:2 0fficers receiving these higher payments prior to
October 1985 will continue to receive them until they move.






RANK o-:\ 0-4 0-5
Alameda, CA $ 292. 83 $ 340. 39 $ 416. 17
Barbers Point, HI 527. 04 511. 38 535. 06
Brunswick, ME 157. 41 170. 31 168. 03
Cecil Field, Fl 148. 18 203. 63 201. 00
Chase Field, Beeville TX 87. 23 111. 51 111. 50
Corpus Christi, TX 210. 17 246. 61 257. 06
Jacksonville, Fl 148. 18 203. 63 201. 00
Key West, Fl 290. 00 291. 40 312. 22
Kingsville, TX 104. 88 135. 76 135. 07
Lemoore, CA 92. 40 113. 84 98. 07
Miramar, San Diego, CA 218. 77 273. 72 282. 85
Moffet Field, CA 316. 83 350. 20 374. 52
Norfolk, VA 167. 46 182. 78 189. 82
North Island, CA 218. 77 273. 72 282. 85
Oceana, Va. Beach, VA 167. 46 182. 78 189. 82
Pensacola, FL 86. 55 106. 90 93. 21
Patuxent River, MD 223. 32 208. 72 212. 69
Point Mugu, CA 234. 43 271. 99 267. 65
Washington, D. C. 282. 05 262. 34 266. 74
Whidbey Island, WA 123. 37 110. 29 116. 41
Whiting Field, Milton, FL 86. 55 106. 90 93. 21
Willow Grove, PA 201. 60 247. 58 248. 55
AVERAGE VHA by Rank: $ 199. 34 $ 223. 02 $ 229. 70
SOURCE: NAVY PAY MANUAL
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higher rent-plus payments. Had these rates been used, the
average VHA rates in Table 3 would have been higher. Table
4 contains the maximum 1985 rent-plus payments solely for
information purposes.
TABLE 4
SELECTED 1985 RENT-PLUS PAYMENTS
PAY-PER-MONTH
GRADE 0-3 0-4 0-5
Agana, Guam $ 807.00 $ 807.00 $ 807.00
Bermuda 1191.00 1316.00 1316.00
Cubi Point, Philippines 673.00 673.00 610.00
Rota, Spain 338.00 341.00 397.00
Sigonella, Sicily 280.00 431.00 533.00
Source: JOINT TRAVEL REGULATIONS
4. Basic Allowance for Subsistence
The Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) is
intended to cover an officer's subsistence costs without
regard to his pay grade or dependency status. All officers
receive the same monthly cash allowance to help defray a
portion of their costs of subsistence. For Fiscal Year 1986
this amount is $ 109. 3 7.
BAS is normally increased on an annual basis by the
same percentage as the increase authorized by Congress for
basic pay. There is no direct correlation between BAS and
the actual cost of food and subsistence experienced by
officers.
C. FEDERAL INCOME TAX ADVANTAGE
Federal income tax is not charged on the amounts
received by an officer for BAQ, VHA, and BAS. This tax-free
income varies from $ 8,906.52 for a Lieutenant to
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$ 10,894.44 for a Commander with dependents. Because the
income from these allowances is not taxed, the military
officer receives a substantial increase in net income, by
the amount of taxes which would have been owed on these
allowances had they been taxed at the officer's normal tax
rate. Congress recognizes that some additional benefits are
received by military members because of this tax advantage
over civilians.
It is difficult to quantify accurately the actual tax
advantage in dollars received by a broad group of Naval
Officers since the Federal income tax rate varies
substantially among officers. The higher the total gross
income received, the more valuable the income tax exemption
on military allowances becomes, due to the progressive
nature of our tax system. The following tables give a good
estimate of the additional monetary benefit of military pay
due to the tax advantage, making the following assumptions
for Naval officers in pay grades 0-3 through 0-5: (1) a
single officer with no dependents, outside income, or major
tax deductions. (2) A married officer with three children,
a non-wage-earning spouse, no outside income, and no major
tax deductions. l 3 Table 5 and Table 6 show tax savings per
year as a function of seniority for single and married offi-
cers. These tax savings will be used to compute average
total pay received. Tax savings computed for single and
married officers receiving different pay combinations are
contained in Appendix A .
1
3
Tax savings were computed by calculating income tax
owed on gross income received minus the personal exemption
( $ 1,040 per individual and qualified dependent). The same
calculations were then made on gross income minus the BA0,
VHA and BAS allowances. Less tax is owed on the smaller~of
the two incomes. The tax savings listed are the differences
in the taxes owed on the two amounts.
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TABLE 5
TAX ADVANTAGE FOR A SINGLE OFFICER
RECEIVING ACIP ONLY
REPRESENTATIVE SAVINGS PER YEAR
YEARS OF SUM OF TAX TAX
COMPLETED FREE ALLOWANCES SAVINGS
SERVICE BAQ+BAS+VHA
8 YOS $ 7,794. 12 $ ! 2,867
9 YOS 7,794. 12 2,867
10 YOS 9,262. 68 3,504
11 YOS 9,262. 68 3,504
12 YOS 9,262. 68 3,610
13 YOS 9,262. 68 3,610
14 YOS 9,262. 68 3,659
15 YOS 9,262. 68 3,659
16 YOS 9,821. 64 4,100
17 YOS 9,821. 64 4,100
18 YOS 9,821. 64 4,135
19 YOS 9,821. 64 4,135
Source: Computed by author from Form 1040
Internal Revenue Service Tax
Tables, 1985.
D. INCENTIVE PAYS
Naval pilots may receive two additional incentive pays,
one for the hazards associated with flying and one to
prevent critical shortages of aviators in specific year
groups with designated skills. Incentive pay is designed to
induce military personnel to volunteer for certain careers,
such as flying. All Navy pilots receive Aviation Career
Incentive Pay and may receive Aviation Officer Continuation
Pay as a supplement to regular military compensation.
Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP), commonly referred
to in the military as 'flight pay', was originally provided
to pilots in recognition of the hazardous nature of duty
involving flying aircraft. Congress enacted the Aviation
Career Incentive Act of 1974 for the purpose of attracting
and retaining pilots in the Armed Forces. ACIP was
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TABLE 6
TAX ADVANTAGE FOR A MARRIED OFFICER
RECEIVING ACIP & AOCP
REPRESENTATIVE SAVINGS PER YEAR
YEARS OF SUM OF TAX TAX
COMPLETED FREE ALLOWANCES SAVINGS
SERVICE BAQ+BAS+VHA
8 YOS $ 8,906. 52 $ 2,383
9 YOS 8,906. 52 2,383
10 YOS 10,227. 48 3,035
11 YOS 10,227. 48 3,035
12 YOS 10,227. 48 3, 143
13 YOS 10,227. 48 3, 143
14 YOS 10,227. 48 3,232
15 YOS 10,227. 44 3,232
16 YOS 10,894. 44 3,675
17 YOS 10,894. 44 3,675
18 YOS 10,894. 44 3,771
19 YOS 10,894. 44 3,771
Source: Computed by author from Form 1040
Internal Revenue Service Tax
Tables, 1985.
recognized by Congress as an incentive pay to officers for
undertaking a career, on a continuing basis, more hazardous
than other service careers.
The Aviation Career Act of 1974 set forth the following
guidelines to award ACIP.
1. An officer who regularly flies on orders will receive
ACIP independent of whether at the moment he is actu-
ally assigned flying duty. In effect, all pilots
receive ACIP throughout their career even when they
are assigned to 'desk jobs';
2. ACIP rates are based on the length of an officer's
aviation service rather than on his grade and total
military service;
3. ACIP rates are highest for the years immediately
following a pilot s first service obligation, which
normally coincide with the retention-critical, flight-
intensive, period of a career;
4. ACIP pay progressively decreases in the senior less-
flight-intensive years of a commissioned career.
[ Ref
.
10 : section two] Table 7 lists ACIP rates.
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TABLE 7
AVIATION CAREER INCENTIVE PAY RATES
Officers Years of

































Source: Navy Pay Manual, section two
During the years 1978-1979 many pilots left because of
the low pay of a Navy pilot relative to pay in the civilian
economy in general and the airline industry in particular.
In response, Congress approved a special continuation pay
for aviation career officers in 1981. The Department of
Defense Authorization Act of 1981 (Pub. Law No. 96-342,94
Stat. 1095 -1096) provided the Services with the ability to
pay career aviators with Aviation Officer Continuation Pay
(AOCP). The Navy pays AOCP as a supplement to ACIP to
correct current or projected shortages of career officers in
critical aviation specialties [ Ref . 11: p. 1] . Since 1981,
the payment specifics of AOCP have changed and will be
discussed below. The United States Navy and Marines have
been the only branches of the Armed Forces to pay AOCP.
Originally, in 1981, the Act provided for payment to
each qualified and electing officer of up to four months
basic pay for each year the officer agreed to remain on
active service beyond the expiration of his obligated
service. Officers qualified for such pay had to:
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1. be entitled to ACIP;
2. be in a paygrade below 0-7;
3. be qualified to perform "operational flying duty"
;
4. have at least 6 but less than 18 years of service as
an officer;
5. be in an aviation specialty designated as "critical";
6. have executed a written agreement to remain on active
duty in aviation service for at least one year, and
7. be on active duty.
[ Ref . 12: p. 2] The Aviation Officer Continuation Pay
authorized by Congress was in addition to any other pay and
allowances, including ACIP, to which an officer might other-
wise be entitled.
AOCP has undergone revisions in payment methods and
amounts since 1981. 14 Presently AOCP is paid only to pilots




4. Carrier Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
5. Carrier Anti-Electronic Warfare (AEW)
6. Carrier Electronic Warfare (EW)
7. Carrier Transport
8. Helo
9. Strategic Communications/Electronic Warfare
In 1985 some aviators eligible to receive AOCP had a
choice of receiving AOCP in yearly installments or as a
lump-sum payment. Also, AOCP was closely targeted to retain
pilots in the shortest supply, those at sea. 15 In 1985, to
receive AOCP, pilots had to meet the following criteria:
14 In 1981, pilots with more than six years of aviation
service had the option of accepting an additional service
obligation of from one to four years. AOCP was paid at the
beginning of each year of additional obligated service.
15 Sea duty has long been recognized for the increased
flying hazard and arduous living conditions. Sea-based
pilots are often away from home for eight to ten months,
working twenty-hour days in peacetime.
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1. agree to remain on active duty for three, four or six
years,
2. have at least six but less than eleven years of activeduty,
3. have at least six years of aviation service,
4. have completed initial service obligation,
5. be assigned primarily to one of the communities listed
above 15 [ Ref. 13: p7 2 J
.
Payment could be taken in installment payments as follows:
1. Three year contract - $ 4,000 per year
2. Four year contract - $ 6,000 per year
3. Six year contract - $ 6,000 per year
The AOCP program was further modified in February, 1985
to meet an increased rate of pilot resignations. To enhance
the financial attractiveness of the AOCP program, Congress
approved a lump-sum payment to selected pilots [Ref. 14: p.
1] . The lump sum pays an aviator at the following rates:
1. Four-year contract - $ 24,000
2. Six-year contract - $ 36,000.
The lump-sum payment is paid to a pilot upon his acceptance
of an increased service obligation to the Navy. Lump sum is




4. Carrier Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW),
5. Carrier Anti-Electronic Warfare (AEW),
6. Carrier Electronic Warfare (EW).
The lump-sum payment is more valuable than a bonus paid in
yearly installments even though the total sums received are
equal. The economic concept of present value states that a
dollar received today is more valuable then one received in
the future. A person may use the dollar received today to
1
6
A community refers to the pilot's primary aircraft
type for which he is warfare-qualified. A Navy pilot tends
to remain with one primary aircraft type, such as fighter or
attack, for his career.
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purchase goods at today's prices. If inflation is present,
the same dollar will buy less in the future. Also, a dollar
received today can be invested to increase in real value
over time. Dollars received today will be more valuable
than one received in the future as a function of the
interest rate a person may earn on these dollars.
Those pilots eligible to receive the lump-sum payment
may also elect instead to be paid in installments. Any
pilot who accepts AOCP has his ACIP reduced from $ 400.00
per month to $ 306. 00 per month during the time of the bonus
commitment. This reduction in ACIP pay for an officer
accepting AOCP pay will total $ 6,768 over a six year
period, or $ 1,128 per year.
This study assumes that a Navy pilot will make a career
choice to remain in the military for twenty-years or join a
major airline as soon as possible following his initial
service obligation. A pilot who remains will accept AOCP at
the maximum rate. Military pay tables will be computed for
the pilot who remains, to account for the receipt of the
following different rates-of-pay:
1. Receives ACIP only, no AOCP bonus.
2. Received ACIP and AOCP on yearly installments.
3. Receives ACIP and lump-sum AOCP bonus.
Table 54 shows the pay received by an officer who receives
ACIP and the the AOCP bonus including the average tax
savings. Appendix A contains other pay computations.
E. OTHER MILITARY BENEFITS
All military members receive the benefits listed in
Table 9 as part of their total military compensation. While
these benefits may be substantial, the calculated monetary
benefit to an officer-pilot was not computed. This is due
to a lack of data and the off-setting benefits received by
civilian pilots, such as free travel for dependents on some





RECEIVING AC IP & INSTALLMENT AOCP
GROSS PAY-PEF.-YEAR
Lieutenant 8 YOS Lieutenant 9 YOS
Base Pay $ 27,860. 40 $ 27,860. 40BAO 5,202. 00 5,202. 00
VHA 2,392. 08 2,392. 08
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 3,672. 00 3,672. 00
AOCP 6,000. 00 6,000. 00
Tax Benefit 2,722. 00 2,722. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 49,160. 92 $ 49,160. 92
LCDR 10 YOS LCDR 12 YOS
Base Pay $ 30,816. 00 $ 32,551. 20
BAO 6,238. 80 6,238. 80
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 3,672. 00 3,672. 00
AOCP 6,000. 00 6,000. 00
Tax Benefit 3,315. 00 3,382. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 54,030. 48 $ 55,832. 68
LCDR 14 YOS LCDR 15 i YOS
Base Pay $ 34,034. 40 $ 34,034. 40
BAO 6,238. 80 6,238. 80
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,800. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,232. 00 3,232. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 52,293. 88 $ 52,293. 88
CDR 16 YOS CDR 18 YOS
Base Pay $ 38,725. 20 $ 40,951. 15
BAO 6,825. 60 6,826. 43
VHA 2,756. 40 2,756. 40
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,440. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,675. 00 3,770. 92
YEARLY PAY $ 58,094. 64 $ 60,055. 36
Source: Author , Navy Pay Manual
without aependen
s




Air Travel overseas for member and dependents
in U. S. for member only
Annual leave (30 days per year all grades)
Burial Allowance
Commissary Stores (groceries at cost plus 5%)
Death Gratuity (six times monthly pays)
Dependency and Indemnity Compensation ($622 to $726)
Disability Retired Pay
Disability Severance Pay
Government Contributions to Social Security
Low-Cost Vacation Resorts and Recreation Areas
Medical Care (Members and Dependents)
Military Exchanges
Mortgage Insurance Premiums
Nondisability Retired and Retainer Pay
Nondisability Severance Pay
Retired Members Medical Care
Survivor Benefit Plan
Unemployment Compensation
Source: Navy Milpers Manual 5030240, 4210160
6230120, 4210260, 3855180 and 3860440.
F. SUMMARY
Military pay for a Navy pilot is a combination of the
following pays and allowances:
1. Basic pay
2. Basic allowance for quarters (BAQ)
3. Variable housing allowance (VHA),
4. Basic allowance for subsistence ( BAS )
,
5. Aviation career incentive pay (ACIP) or "flight pay",
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6. Aviation Officer Continuation Pay ( AOCP )
,
7. Federal tax advantage on tax-free pays and allowances.
To compare career earnings between a pilot who remains
in the Navy for a twenty-year career vs. a Navy pilot who
joins a major airline after his initial service obligation,
I have constructed earning tables in constant 1986 dollars.
Using constant dollars assumes that pay raises for each
group will match the yearly inflation rate. The average tax
advantage for single and married oficers are included in the
Navy pilot's yearly salary calculations. This is necessary
to fairly compare one group with a tax advantage to another
with none. Simply put, the Navy pilot would need to receive
the additional amount of his tax advantage as a civilian to
achieve equivalent buying power. For those readers who wish
to examine the Navy salary without the Federal tax advan-
tage, the required tables are in Appendix A .
Table 22 lists career earnings for a Navy pilot
receiving AOCP installment payments of $ 6,000 per year from
the eighth through thirteenth year of military service.
These Tables will be used in Chapter Five to compare the
present value of career earnings. Other possible pay combi-
nations for pilots receiving ACIP and the lump-sum AOCP
bonus are contained in Appendix A .
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TABLE 10
NAVY PILOT CAREER EARNINGS
RECEIVING ACIP & INSTALLMENT AOCP










8 YOS $ 46, 438. 92 $ 49, 160. 92
9 YOS 46, 483. 92 49, 160. 92
10 YOS 50, 715. 48 54, 030. 48
11 YOS 50, 715. 48 54, 030. 48
12 YOS 52, 450. 68 55, 832. 68
13 YOS 52, 450. 68 55, 832. 68
14 YOS 49, 061. 88 52, 293. 88
15 YOS 49. 061. 88 52, 292. 88
16 YOS 54, 419. 64 58, 094. 64
17 YOS 54, 419. 64 58, 094. 64
18 YOS 56, 284. 44 60, 055. 36
19 YOS 56, 284. 44 60, 055. 36
Source: Computed by author





III. AIRLINE PILOT PAY ELEMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Unlike his salaried military counter part, the civilian
airline pilot working for a major carrier is paid hourly
based on crew position, aircraft flown, and seniority.
Captains are the highest paid pilots, followed by first
officers (co-pilots) and second officers (flight engineers)
[ Ref
.
15: p. 1] . Major airlines pay pilots at different
rates for flying identical aircraft and holding identical
positions. This chapter's purpose is to determine accu-
rately the yearly pay a newly-hired ex-Navy pilot can expect
on average to receive from a major airline during a thirty
year career. l 7
The earnings of airline pilots were largely determined
according to a basic pay formula established by the National
Labor Board on May 10th, 1934 (decision No. 83) [Ref. 16:
p. 22] . Originally, this formula included longevity or base
pay, hourly pay and mileage pay. In 1947, a forth factor,
gross weight pay, was added through collective bargaining.
Since that time, the pay formula has called for the sum of
these four items which are discussed in detail below.
Figures quoted in the following tables are taken from
current pilot contracts with major airlines. The specific
airlines are not referenced in the text but listed only as




The modal age at which military pilots are hired by
airlines following the pilot's initial service obligation i;
thirty. The average is thirty-two. Airline pilots cease
flying as captains upon reaching age 60. This allows the
Navy pilot, at best, to fly thirty years with a major
airline.
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B. COMPONENTS OF AIRLINE PILOT PAY
1. Longevity or Base Pay
Longevity pay is paid to pilots with more than one
year of service who have completed their probationary
status. It varies with a pilot's length of service with an
airline and sometimes with the type of aircraft the pilot
flies. Longevity is not transferable between airlines.
Rates are negotiated on an hourly or monthly basis. Table
11 lists longevity pay. The highest rates are paid to those
pilots flying the largest aircraft.
2. Hourly Pay
Hourly pay is a negotiated rate based on the average
speed of the aircraft. It is paid in addition to other
rates of compensation and is paid for hours flown or cred-
ited as a captain. It is usually paid to all captains
flying different aircraft at the same rate but may vary
based on equipment flown. Some airline contracts call for a
different rate to be paid for hours flown during day and
night time periods. However, most contracts also call for a
simple average of the two negotiated rates to be paid.
Table 12 lists representative rates.
3. Mileage Pay
Mileage pay is a negotiated rate paid based on the
speed of an aircraft multiplied by a monetary rate. In most
recent contracts, this rate has been three cents per mile
flown. Pilots are paid a monthly mileage pay for hours
flown or credited as a captain. Pilots flying the faster
jet aircraft will fly a greater distance per hour earning a
higher monthly mileage pay. In computing the mileage flown
by captains for flying pay purposes, the actual time from
block-to- block 18 or the scheduled time from block-to-block,
1
8
Block-to-block means that period of time beginning
when an aircraft first moves from the ramp blocks and ending
when the aircraft next comes to a stop at the ramp at any
station or other point of termination.
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TABLE 11
AIRLINE LONGEVITY PAY RATES
Major Airline Longevity Pay Table 1985
For hours flown or credited as a captain
at the following hourly rate:
Major Airline Example A
All Aircraft
1st year $ 2. 76
2nd year 3. 03
3rd year 3. 30
4th year 3. 57
5th year 3. 84
6th year 4. 11
7th year 4. 38
8th year 4. 65
9th year 4. 92
10th year 5. 19
11th year 5. 46
12th year & 5. 73
thereafter
Major Airline Example B
B-747 DC-10 B-727
36. 40 34. 69 17. 96
37. 44 35. 82 19. 16
38. 33 36. 84 21. 26
39. 36 37. 93 22. 34
40. 33 39. 02 23. 49
41. 33 40. 09 24. 49
42. 35 41. 14 25. 40
43. 35 42. 07 26. 03
44. 23 42. 63 26. 64
44. 80 43. 25 27. 27
45. 40 43. 85 27. 90














Source: Major airline contracts
whichever is greater, is normally used for all flights.
Table 13 shows how contracts specify the average speed of
company aircraft for pay purposes, to compute this pay.
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TABLE 12
AIRLINE HOURLY PAY RATES
Major Airline HOURLY Pay Table 1985
For hours flown or credited as a captain










Major Airline Example B
DAY NIGHT
1985 $ 82. 75 85. 25
Source: Major airline contracts
TABLE 13
AIRLINE MILEAGE PAY
For hours flown or credited as a captain
at the following hourly rate:























Source: Major airline contracts
42
4. Gross Weight Pay
Gross weight pay is paid at a rate normally three
cents for each thousand pounds of certified aircraft rate.
As aircraft have become larger, this pay has become greater
than in the past and more important to a pilot's total
income. Table 14 shows negotiated weights of selected
aircraft and corresponding gross pays.
TABLE 14
AIRLINE GROSS WEIGHT PAY
For hours flown or credited as a captain
at the following hourly rate:
Major Airline Example A





















Source: Major airline contract
5. Special Pays
Pilots receive special pays for international flying
and for using special navigation equipment. International
flying rates vary from $ 1.25 per hour for a junior pilot to
$ 3. 50 for a captain. When a navigator specifically
assigned navigation duties is not onboard an aircraft flying
internationally, captains typically receive $ 3. 00 per hour,




Pilots are paid monthly for expenses they incur
while performing their duties. Expense payments are
commonly paid separate from hourly wages and are not subject
to withholding taxes. The following are the most common
expenses for which pilots receive refunds:
1. Overseas duty expenses paid to pilots stationed perma-
nently overseas.
2. Non-domicile pay< paid when, for the convenience of
the company, a pilot is temporarily assigned to fly
from a city away from his permanent home.
3. Expenses incurred for transportation away from his
permanent home when transportation is not provided.
4. Hotel expenses incurred during lay-overs at cities
away from home.
5. Meal expenses, typically calculated at $ 1.25 per
flight hour.
These pays are not included as pilot wages or recorded on
pilots' W-2 Federal wage records.
C. PAY COMPUTATIONS
The sum of the four major pays, longevity, hourly,
mileage, and gross weight, is the hourly wage of the
aircraft captain. The first and second officer each receive
a set percentage of a captain's pay for the aircraft on
which they crew. Only longevity pay is normally paid based
on the individual pilot's longevity, rather than the
captain' s longevity. Table 15 shows the relative percent-
ages of a captain' s pay paid to first and second officers.
Computing a pilot's monthly pay requires knowledge of
the pilot's position in the crew, the type of aircraft, and
the number of hours flown. Pay is a product of hours flown,
a captain's hourly pay rate for the aircraft, the pilot's
percentage of the captain' s pay based on crew position, and
longevity pay as shown in equation 3.1 .
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TABLE 15
FIRST AND SECOND OFFICER PERCENTAGE
OF CAPTAIN'S PAY RECEIVED
Major Airline Longevity r Pay Table 1985
For hours flown or credited as a captain
First Second
Officer Officer







2st year of longevity
3rd year of longevity
4th year of longevity
5th year of longevity
6th year of longevity
7th year of longevity
8th year of longevity
9th year of longevity 66.5%
67.5%10th year of longevity 59.5%
59.5%11th year of longevity 68%68I68^
12th year of longevity
60^and thereafter
Source: Major airline contract.
Pilot Pay = (Hours Flown) x ((Position Percentage) x
'Gross + Hourly + Mileage Pay) + Longevity
ay) ( eqn 3.1)<p
D. PILOT PROBATIONARY WAGES
A first-year probationary pilot receives none of the
pays discussed earlier. Instead, he receives a small monthly
salary regardless of the aircraft or hours flown. Table 16
lists 1980, 1984, and 1985 probationary pilot wages.
E. MINIMUM PAY GUARANTEE
The majority of pilot contracts with the major airlines
contain a formula to compute a minimum monthly guarantee of
sixty-eight (68) hours of flying pay (longevity, hourly,
mileage and gross weight pay) computed at the composite
captain, first or second officer pay rates.
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TABLE 16
AIRLINE PILOT PROBATIONARY WAGES
GROSS PAY PER MONTH
AIRLINE YEAR: 1980 1984 1985
American $ 1,438 $ 1,690 $ 1,500
Continents 1 1,200 1,250 1,250
Delta 1,000 1,000 1,000
Eastern 1,050 1,375 1,325
Flying Ti gers N/A 1,500 1,500
Northwest 1,150 1,500 1,400
Pan AM N/A 1,500 1,500
Piedmont 950 1,100 1,100
Republic 1,000 1,325 1,219
TWA 1,350 1,350 1,350
United 1,384 1,500 1,800
USAir 940-1,030 1,250 1,250
Western N/A 1,200 1,500
Source: FAPA
This establishes a wage "base" for pilots. In addition, a
pilot who flys more than average in one month may "bank"
those excess hours to use for pay purposes in a month when
fewer hours are flown. Also of note is that airlines and
the Federal government have "caps" on the number of hours a
pilot may fly. This limits maximum earnings.
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IV. COMPUTATION OF MAJOR AIRLINE AVERAGE PAY
A. INTRODUCTION
Certainly, by any standards, one must conclude airlinelabor has been very generously rewarded over the years.These jobs are the envy of many Americans. "
Dr. George W. James [ Ref . 17]
Major airlines pay their pilots at different wage rates.
First and second oficers receive a percentage of the
aircraft captain's pay. A pilot's pay is determined by the
hours he flies, his seniority, and the airline for which he
works. The importance of hours flown is demonstrated by the
pilot's wage equation 4.1 .
Pilot Pay = (Hours Flown) x {(Position Percentage) x(Gross + Hourly + Mileage Pay) + Longevity
Pay) y (eqn 4.1)
Since pay for all but a probationary pilot is based on hours
flown, pilots who fly more earn more.
Seniority plays a crucial role in pilot pay. All
"jobs," the position of the pilot, the aircraft flown, and
the aircraft route, are bid on by company pilots monthly or
quarterly. The largest aircraft and longest non-stop routes
pay the highest hourly rates. Pilots with sufficient
seniority are able to fly the highest-paying aircraft and
routes. Beginning pilots usually crew on smaller aircraft
flying frequent short distance commuter flights. Since
pilots are paid based on hours flown, junior pilots flying
short routes must work longer than pilots making longer
flights 19 to earn the same flight time.
19 Short flights involve more frequent stops to load and
unload passengers. Time spent at an airport does not fully
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The individual airline for which a pilot flies affects
career earnings because pay formulas and flying opportuni-
ties differ across companies. Also, the financial strength
of a company affects pilot promotion rates and lay-off prob-
abilities. Rapidly expanding airlines, such as Piedmont,
rapidly promote pilots to captain. Promotion to captain,
for example, usually means a forty percent higher wage than
that of a first officer. Expanding airlines offering rapid
promotions but a below average pay scale may actually offer
a pilot higher career earnings due to an above average
promotion rate. Also, more pilot flight hours will probably
be available with expanding airlines. Weaker, non-expanding
airlines offer few if any promotions. Pan-American
airlines, for example, furloughed many pilots after deregu-
lation; many captains and first officers were demoted.
Financially weak airlines frequently ask for pilot wage
reductions. If they don't get these reductions they may go
bankrupt, as did Brantiff and Continental. A reduction or
halt in promotion opportunities adversely affects present
and future pilot earnings. A company bankruptcy or massive
pilot lay-off may cripple pilot earnings.
Although pilot skills are general and transferable from
one airline to another, union rules usually prohibit an
unemployed senior pilot from being laterally hired by
another airline at his old pay. A pilot joining another
union airline usually begins near the bottom of that compa-
ny's pilot wage scale. In summary, while some airlines pay
scales may appear high, one must be promoted to captain to
earn them and remain with the company for a full career to
benefit significantly from them.
count as paid flight time.
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I have researched available information sources to
determine the present average wage a new pilot can expect to
receive yearly based on his seniority. All elements of
research will be discussed individually.
B. FORECASTING AIRLINE PILOT WAGES
1. Past Studies
The initial step was to search for any studies which
computed either airline pilot wages as a function of the
pilot's seniority with the company or an average pilot wage
over a career. Computer searches failed to find any relevant
studies.
Data on pilots' wages were obtained from Future
Aviation Professionals of America (Decatur GA. ), the U. S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Washington,
D. C. ), the Airline Pilots Association (Washington, D. C. ),
individual airline contracts, and the Airline Transport
Association (Washington, D.C. ). Only the Air Line Pilots
Association had available pilot data based on pilot age and
seniority. Moreover, no group had forecast pilot average
career earnings. Studies comparing Navy officer-pilot pay
to airline pilot pay used the average wage of an airline
pilot for the years studied. My investigation found that
using the average pilot pay for airlines was unsuitable
because it skewed airline earnings to a higher than actual
level [ Ref . 18]. The reason is as follows: as the airline
industry enters a recession, junior pilots are furloughed.
The average airline pilot wage increases as the lower-paid
junior pilots leave [Ref. 19]. To truly capture the career
earnings of a future pilot, the research must take into
account the possibility of these lay-offs sometime during a
career. The use of average wages in a study fails to
capture the 'true' potential wage flow during a pilots
career.
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2. Airline Contract Survey
There are, in the United States, fourteen major
airline companies. 20 Thirteen of the major airlines were
surveyed. Additionally, nine of the eighteen larger
national airlines were contacted with requests for pilot
contracts and wage histories. 21
Contracts were obtained from seven major and four
national airlines. 22 These contracts were used to develop
probable pilot salaries over a career based on probable crew
position and aircraft flown. The probable crew position and
aircraft flown by a representative pilot was computed using
Markovian analysis and the total number and mix of company
aircraft. A normal pilot promotion rate from the lowest
through highest paying positions was assumed. This method,
while extremely useful in determining the first four years
of earnings of a pilot's career, was found not to be accu-
rate beyond the six-year mark when compared with actual
pilot earnings. This may be caused by fluctuations in
promotions by individual airlines and the individual pilot's
desire to be promoted or to work longer hours. Appendix B
contains a Markovian analysis of one airline and a more
detailed explanation of the Markov model.
In 1978 airline deregulation brought turmoil to the
airline industry. Profits fell and pilot promotion rates
became erratic. Healthy, expanding airlines rapidly
increased their work force. Pilot promotions were acceler-
ated. Weaker airlines, such as American, furloughed many
pilots after deregulation yet still retained 1,400
2
"Major airlines are defined by the U. S. Department of
Labor as those companies with one billion dollars or more in
yearly revenues.
21 National airlines earn from $ 75 million to $ 1
billion dollars a year. Among the most well-known national
airlines are Frontier and People Express.
22 The companies contacted will not be referenced by name
due to the promise of non-disclosure by the author.
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non-flying pilots on the payroll [ Ref . 20: p. 41]. Laying
off pilots effectively demotes pilots who remain. Some
captains and first officers must move back to fill the
vacated second officer seats. For these reasons, fore-
casting pilot salary based on airline contracts and assumed
promotion rates, although informative, was deemed unreliable
for forecasts of thirty year pilot career earnings.
C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF AIRLINE PILOT WAGES
1. Pilot Union Data
The Airline Pilots Association represents nearly all
pilots of the major airlines. The exceptions to ALPA repre-
sentation are American Airlines and Federal Express.
Together, the major airlines employ approximately 29,600
pilots. Very accurate 1983 wage data for all ALPA members
based on age, seniority, airline, and type of aircraft were
obtained courtesy of the Airline Pilots Association. Data
for American Airlines, which is not represented by the ALPA,
or Continental Airlines, which has been on strike, were
obtained from union contracts and from the Future Aviation
Professionals of America. The only data which could be
obtained on Federal Express pilots was the maximum yearly
earnings estimates from FAPA. For this reason, Federal
Express, a cargo-only company employing approximately 600
pilots, or two percent of all major airline pilots, was
dropped from this survey.
2. Industrial Data of Maximum Pilot Wage Estimates
The Future Aviation Professionals of America, FAPA,
formerly known as Future Pilots of America, publishes a
pilot salary survey yearly which is widely reported and used
by the press to report pilot wages. FAPA receives its data
from two sources: pilots who are members of FAPA and snap-
shot wage information from the Airline Pilots Association.
FAPA's main objective is to promote the beginning aviation
careers of prospective pilots with the major and national
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airlines. FAPA offers job counseling prior to airline
interviews, medical information, and other forms of support
to an aspiring pilot.
The wage survey published by FAPA lists the maximum
wages which a pilot can expect to receive [ Ref . 21]. Table
17 lists 1985 maximum pilot wages as published by FAPA.
However, a pilot now joining an airline may never receive
these maximum wages for the following reasons:
1. These maximum wages listed are for the companies' most
senior pilots flying the largest, highest paying
aircraft. Senior captains with many of the companies
have between twenty-nine and thirty-three years
seniority. An ex-military pilot, who is, on average,
thirty-two years old when initially hired by the
airlines, will reach a maximum of twenty-seven years
pay seniority. Also, the seniority structure of most
major airlines is highly pyramidal with a relatively
small percentage of pilots earning the maximum wages.
2. Maximum and tenth year salaries listed by FAPA include
those companies which have an upper and lower two-
tiered wage scale. This relatively new wage conces-
sion by the pilots' union retains the high wages for
pilots now flying with the company. New pilots typi-
cally may earn only half of the present listed maximum
salaries.
3. Maximum salaries are based on a pilot flying the
maximum flight hours offered by the airline. The
average pilot surveyed by the Department of Labor
however, does not fly these maximum rates and hence,
does not receive the maximum pays listed. The average
hours flown will be documented at the end of this
Chapter.
4. No allowance is made for loss of salary due to low
promotion rates, lay-offs
<
strikes and the total loss
of wages during some portion of a pilot's career. 23
3. Airline Union Data of Actual Pilot Wages
ALPA collected from pilot's Federal W-2 tax forms
all wages a pilot received during calendar year 1983
[Ref. 22: p. ii] . These data are recorded for each pilot
who earned at least one dollar during calendar year 1983.
If newly hired pilots, who would work less than a full
23Temporary lay-offs are not uncommon among junior
airline pilots. They frequently joke that you re not really
sure you are an airline pilot until you've been laid off.
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TABLE 17
1985 FAPA MAXIMUM PILOT WAGE ESTIMATES
1 MAXIMUM GROSS YEARLY EARNINGS
YEAR OF SERVICE
Airline 1 2 10 MAXIMUM
American 2 $ 18,000 $ 22,000 $ 78,732 $ 123,312
Continental 3 15,000 27,000 50,004 50,004
Delta 12,000 38,400 78,000 156,000
Eastern 15,900 36,216 69,600 138,000
Flying rigers 18,000 33,600 132,000 174,000
Northwes t 16,800 55,860 119,016 152,664
Pan AM 18,000 30,000 67,200 138,000
Piedmont 4 13,200 39,444 130,512 127,764
Republic 14,628 25,944 83,904 83,904
TWA 16,200 25,200 56,400 139,200
United 21,600 26,400 73,200 160,800
USAir 15,000 33,000 84,000 138,000
Western 18,000 25,152 52,800 78,000
Source: '.FAPA 1985 Pilot Wage Survey
NOTES: 1 FAPA original
probationary,
pay-per month.
publication listed wages for
second and tenth year pilots as
Author has converted tables
to pay per year for ease of comparison.
2 American salaries for years ten and maximum
are for the old pay scale. New hired pilots





ntal Airlines strike wages displayed.
' cut pilot wages by 50% or more by
ng bankruptcy.
4 FAPA Piedmont 10th year wage listed
as $ 10.876 per month, or
higher than maximum salary rate.
calendar year, were included in this study, their lower
wages would skew the data towards a lower average airline
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wage. To prevent this, all data for those workers of less
than three years seniority were discarded. This is valid
since the first year's probationary pilot wage is known with
certainty and the probable second year salaries can be
computed from FAPA maximum salaries adjusted for average
pilot hours flown.
Using actual pilot wages for a full calendar year
captures nearly all wage variables. Pilots who seek rapid or
slower promotions, who fly few or many hours, or who fly
smaller rather than larger aircraft by choice are all repre-
sented. The data set of twenty- thousand pilots over the
span of pilot seniority represents the earnings of many
different career paths. A regression analysis of the pilot
wage data by individual airline was completed using a
statistical SAS program [ Ref . 23]. The goal was to explain
pilot's wages as a function of seniority. Table 18 displays
the regression results and the corresponding R - squared
value for each individual company's equation. A pilot's
wage was assumed to be a function of a pilot's company
seniority. The equation for pilot wages used is:
Pilot Pay = Base pay + (Seniority x Y
Variable) (eqn 4.2)
How well does pilot seniority predict earnings? The
R-squared value shown in Table 18 for each airline predicts
the general strength of the linear relation between
seniority and wages. The stronger the correlation, the
better seniority predicts wages. An R-squared value of 1. 00
would show a perfect correlation between seniority and
wages, while an R-squared value of 0. 00 would indicate no
effect of seniority on wages. In these equations, seniority
is seen to highly predict wages received. R-square values
range from 78. to 97. 3. This makes intuitive sense.
Airline wages are based on crew position and hours flown.
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TABLE 18
1983 AIRLINE PILOT WAGES
REGRESSION EQUATIONS
SUMMARY OF PILOT WAGES REGRESSION ANALYSIS






Flying Tigers Pay =
Northwest Pay =





















Note 1: ALPA data not available on these airlines.
Note 2: (YOS) is completed years of service with the
airline. A probationary pilot has zero YOS.
Note 3: Valid ranges of regression equations listed
in Appendix C . Equations estimate
years of service from six to thirty.
$ 43,908 + 3, 308 l'YOS
$ 28,068 + 2
t
670 i YOS
$ 50,111 + 2, 882 I YOS
$ 25,585 + 3, 807 1 YOS
$ 34,291 + 2
k
409 l YOS
$ 44,039 + 2, 520 1 YOS
$ 61,443 + 1, 740 | YOS
$ 17,194 + 2, 989 i YOS
$ 9,169 + 3, 871 I YOS
$ 42,336 3, 302 1 YOS















The more senior of the pilots bid to fly the larger aircraft
on the higher-paying routes. This leaves the lower-paying
beginning positions to those pilots with the least
seniority.
55
Table 19 displays the predicted salaries received by
airline pilots in 1983 for a pilot hired at age and thirty.
This is the mode age at which ex-military pilots are hired
by the major airlines following an initial service
obligation. 24
TABLE 19
































Note 1. American and Continental wages not
regressed.
Note 2: (YOS) depicted indicates beginning-year
seniority. A probationary pilot has zero YOS.
Note 3: Ranges of regression equations listed
in Appendix C .




base wage + seniority times
litary pilots will usually
seniority of
24 The maximum seniority used in the regression equations
for ex-military pilots will be twenty-nine years because
pilots must retire upon reaching age sixty.
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D. CORRECTIONS TO MAXIMUM AIRLINE PILOT SALARY ESTIMATES
1. Average Hours Flown
The career pilot wages developed from the regression
equations displayed in Table 19 for 1983 are less than the
maximum pilot wages FAPA predicts for 1985. The lower wages
may be explained by the fact that pilots fly, on average,
fewer hours than FAPA used to estimate maximum pay. Airline
pilot pay has been shown to be a function of the hours a
pilot flies per month times the negotiated pay rate of the
airline. While airlines may guarantee pilots a minimum
number of hours (typically sixty-eight hours per month) FAPA
assumes each pilot is flying a maximum number, usually
eighty, 25 However pilots, on average, over a career do not
fly eighty or more hours per month and, therefore, do not
receive the full maximum income flow projected in Table 17 .
Union-negotiated contracts also limit the maximum
hours a pilot may fly in any month. Pilots at American
Airlines for example are limited to flying 78 hours for five
months of the year and 75 hours a month for the remainder
[ Ref . 24]. This yearly maximum for American pilots equals
76. 25 hours per month and is less than the 78 hours per
month for American used by FAPA in Table 17 .
Information from the United States Department of
Labor listing average hours flown by pilots of major and
national airlines from 1970 to 1984 was used to compute a
weighted average of actual hours flown by the pilots of the
major airlines. Appendix D contains the survey data. These
surveys list the number of pilots surveyed and the range of
hours which they flew during the survey period. Weights
were assigned to the data in relation to the number of
pilots flying in each five-hour grouping of monthly flight
hours. The weighted averages are listed in Table 21 . The
25 The average number of flight hours used by FAPA in
their 1985 pilot salary estimates was 80. 86 flight hours per
month.
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simple average of 74. 4 pilots hours per month is eight
percent less than the 80. 86 hour average listed by FAPA in
their 1985 Pilot Salary Survey. Table 22 lists the differ-
ences, as a percentage, between the FAPA maximum pilot hours
projected and the Department of Labor ten-year pilot hour
average computed by the author. Since pay is directly tied
to hours flown, the decrease in pilot hours will explain a
nine percent difference between FAPA's estimate and the
wages shown in Table 19 .
TABLE 20
FAPA MAXIMUM ESTIMATED FLIGHT
HOURS PER 1YIONTH FOR MAJOR AIRLINE PILOTS 1985
number of fid.ght














AVERAGE 1 HOURS 80. 86








Captain 72.2 77. 2 74. 7
First Officer 72. 3 77. 3 74. 8
Second Officer 72. 5 77. 5 75.





from data in L
TABLE 22
PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE IN PILOT HOURS
BETWEEN MAXIMUM AND AVERAGE ESTIMATES
FAPA Ten-Year Percentage
AIRLINE ESTIMATE Average Difference
American 78 74. 4 -. 05
Continental 83 74. 4 -. 12
Delta 78 74. 4 -. 05
Eastern 83 74. 4 -. 12
Flying Tigers 80 74. 4 -. 08
Northwest 75 74. 4 -. 01
Pan AM 80 74. 4 -. 08
Piedmont 80 74. 4 -. 08
Reoublic 80 74. 4 -. 08
TWA 80 74. 4 -. 08
United 80 74. 4 -. 08
USAir 85 74. 4 -. 14
Western 85 74. 4 -. 14
AVERAGE 80. 86 74. 4 -. 09
Sources: Author. FAPA 1985 P Hot Salary Survey
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E. POST-1983 PILOT PAY CHANGES
Locals of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) have
accepted wage deferrals or reductions forty-five times since
1980 [ Ref . 25: p. 127]. Table 23 lists a summary of wage
changes since 1983 experienced by major airline pilots.
Only the pilots of one airline, Northwest, have received a
pay increase. Table 24 lists the projected pilot 1986 wages
for an ex-Navy pilot initially hired at age thirty adjusted
for these post-1983 wage changes. Appendix E contains an
abstract of wage changes in detail along with reference
sources.
An accurate pilot wage base has been developed for 1983,
using regression analysis for pilots with seniority above
seven years. By applying the salary increases and decreases
pilots have experienced since 1983, we can get an accurate
picture of the probable average 1986 salary. This will be
done in the following manner: 26
1. The FAPA first year salary will be used.
2. FAPA maximum second-year salaries will be reduced by
the percentage difference between a pilot flying
maximum hours and one flying the industrial average.
3. The pilot's tenth year and maximum salary will be
based on the 1983 company regression salary modified
for company pay changes since 1983. Reductions for
years 3 through 6 of current two-tiered wage scales
are not used. If included, they would slightly reduce
the average airline pilot s salary. These reductions
could not be verified by the author prior to publica-
tion of this thesis.
26However FAPA' s second year salary was too high for
Northwest Airlines. Using the current union contract and
promotion schedule a Northwest pilot will be earning 42 % of
$ 122. 93 per hour and flying 74. 4 hours per month. Yearly
earnings will be $ 46,095 vs. $ 55,301.
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TABLE 23
MAJOR AIRLINE WAGE CHANGES
1983 TO 1985
AIRLINE
American 50 % reduction, $ 65,000 top pay
Continental 50 % reduction
Delta No Change
Eastern 22 % Reduction
Flying Tigers No Change
Northwest 14 % Pay Increase
Pan AM Delayed Pay Increases
No change.
Piedmont 28 % Pay Reduction
for first seven years.
Republic 10
15
% Reduction years 1-3
% Reduction after first year
TWA No Change
United 42 % Reduction first year average
10 % Average reduction years 2-5
reduction probably permanent.
USAir No Change
Western 30. 5 % Wage reduction
Source: Appendix E •
F. MAJOR AIRLINE PILOT AVERAGE CAREER PAY
1. Weighted Averages
Now, an accurate average wage structure for each of
the major airlines has been determined for a new pilot hired
in 1986. An individual pilot may earn more or less than
Table 24 predicts, as an individual function of wage vari-
ables and personal preference. Now, to determine the
average career-pay of a new pilot entering the industry, the
weighted average of the wages in Table 24 must be calcu-
lated. Using weighted averages assumes a pilot' s chance of
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TABLE 24
AIRLINE PILOT AVERAGE YEARLY




AIRLINE 1 2 10 29
American $ 18. 000 $ 20, 900 $ 39, 366 $ 65, 000
Continental 15 000 23, 760 50, 004 50, 004
Delta 12, 000 36, 480 78, 485 135, 205
Eastern 15, 900 31, 870 44, 079 83, 513
Flying Tigers 18, 000 30, 912 76, 581 137, 767
Northwest 16, 800 46, 095 68, 562 158, 911
Pan AM 18, 000 27, 600 55, 445 105, 389
Piedmont 13, 200 36, 288 67, 698 116, 110
Republic 14, 628 23, 868 60, 135 95, 605
TWA 16, 200 23, 184 46, 629 105, 599
United 12, 528 24, 288 83, 234 126, 456
USAir 15, 000 28, 380 73, 341 136, 825
Western 18, 000 21, 630 33, 804 69, 440
Source: Author
being hired by and or remaining with an airline equals the
number of pilots employed by the airline divided by the
total number of pilots in the entire industry.
Table 25 lists the major airlines, the number of
pilots employed with each company, and the fraction of total
major airline pilots employed by each airline. By assigning
weights to the salary for a new thirty-year old pilot
displayed in Table 24 in proportion to the percentage of
pilots employed by each company, a true industry average
wage for a newly hired pilot may be determined. Table 26
displays the results of applying the weighted pilot averages
determined in Table 25 to the salaries in Table 24 .
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2. Pilot Average Career Pay Computations
By applying the weighted averages in Table 25 to the
company pay scale developed in Table 24 an accurate 30-year
airline pilot salary, expressed in constant 1986 dollars,
may be projected for the average ex-military plot. Some
pilots, such as those working for Northwest and Delta, may
make more than others, such as ones with American or
Western; nothing is guaranteed. Table 26 projects a career
salary for an average pilot flying the average number of
flight hours for his company. The assumption is made that
no further changes in the airline industry pilot wage struc -
ture will occur . If this assumption is relaxed, airline
pilot wages could be projected lower since the trend has




PERCENTAGE OF PILOTS EMPLOYED
EACH MAJOR AIRLINE
BY





American 237 3,437 . 118
Continental 90 1,400 . 048
Delta 227 3,773 . 130
Eastern 278 3,475 . 119
Flying Tige]rs 31 682 . 023
Northwest 109 1,698 . 058
Pan AM 126 » 1,627 . 056
Piedmont 88 919 . 032
Republic 163 1,616 . 056
TWA 156 2,791 . 096
United 316 4,934 . 170
USAir 124 1,462 . 050
Western 73 1,261 . 043
TOTAL: 29,075 1. 000







Gross Yearly E arnings In 1986 Dollars
YOS YOS
1 $ 15,147 16 $ 71,813
2 28,305 17 73,863
3 31,028 18 75,972
4 34,053 19 78,142
5 37,411 20 80,371
6 41,140 21 82,666
7 45,280 22 85,025
8 49,878 23 87,453
9 54,984 24 89,949
10 60,654 25 92,518
11 62,386 26 95,159
12 64,166 27 97,875
13 65,988 28 100,669
14 67,882 29 103,543






Computed from age thirty to sixty.
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V. THE EFFECT OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION PH PILOT EARNINGS .
"With airline labor accounting for more than thirty-five
percent of airline costs, and receiving employee compen-
sation more than seventy-five percent above the U. S.
average, it is essential that downward adjustments in
labor costs are achieved .... If they are not, bank-
ruptcies, mergers, layoffs and other actions clearly
demonstrate that the companies cannot continue to do
business as usual, and labor and consumers will lose."
Dr. George W. James [ Ref . 26]
A. INTRODUCTION
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gave the existing
United States domestic airline industry monopolistic regula-
tory protection. This regulatory scheme was allegedly
designed to strengthen and promote air transportation in the
United States through regulation and protection. The Act
accomplished this by:
1. Limiting the number of airlines by preventing new
entrants into markets.
2. Restricting the routes and number of flights flown by
individual airlines.
3. Required government approval for the airline's ticket
pricing structure. This passed along increased costs
to the public and set a floor on ticket prices which
prevented price competition.
Those airlines which existed under this regulatory
market expanded and profited from 1938 to the advent of
airline deregulation in 1978. 27
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) enforced airline regu-
lations. A rate of return on investment was used to set
ticket prices. Since airlines could pass on labor costs to
consumers, pilots had great bargaining power to increase
their wages. Airlines found it easier to increase pilot
wages than to endure a strike that halted airline
27 These major airlines were: American, Delta, Eastern,
Northwest, TWA, and United.
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operations. In this environment, pilot's wages rapidly
increased from the early 1960's through 1978. Senior pilots
for major airlines earned in excess of $ 130,000 per year.
Between 1969 and 1979 the average total compensation per
airline employee nearly tripled [ Ref . 27]. This increase
was sixty percent more than the increase in inflation.
B. AIRLINE DEREGULATION
The 1978 Airline Deregulation Act was a result of
growing public support for deregulation in general and of
problems encountered by the CAB while attempting to regulate
the airlines. The stable and prosperous airline industry
suffered two setbacks in the 1970' s. As wide body jets were
purchased, airline seat capacity outstripped passenger
demand. The Arab fuel embargo rapidly escalated fuel
expenses. Both events severely hurt airline profits. The
CAB in the past would have passed these cost increases on to
the public through higher ticket prices. Faced by growing
public sentiment to deregulate, the CAB began to favor
increased competition. The consensus was that the airlines
would be better off without formal regulation.
The Deregulation Act of 1978 cleared the way for airline
competition and eliminated protective pricing policies. Over
a period of six years the Act specifically: 28
1. Eliminated restrictions on new domestic airlines'
entry into the market.
2. Eliminated restrictions on new routes to additional
cities.
3. Simplified the process for dropping airline service to
selected cities (elimination of unprofitable routes).
4. Eliminated all airline cargo/passenger restrictions.
28 Restrictions frequently forbid competition between
certain cities. This resulted in inefficiencies. An airline
flying a route from cities A to B and from C to D may have
been forbidden to carry its passengers from city B to C.
The olane could continue flying empty or with cargo. Once
in city C, the plane could again fly passengers.
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5. Allowed pricing competition. Airlines could, without
approval set fares fifty percent below or five percent
aoove a 1977 standard industry fare level.
The introduction of competition had a profound effect on the
airline industry and its employees.
C. AIRLINE EARNINGS
Major airline earnings were no longer protected by regu-
lation. Increased competition from new sellers, such as
People Express, forced ticket prices down on routes serviced
by these new airlines. Airline net revenues decreased as
airlines used discounted airfares and promotional activities
(frequent flyers programs) to fill more airline seats.
Ticket-pricing competition severely eroded profits. The
percentage of total coach traffic flying at a discount rate
increased from forty-two in 1978 to eighty-eight in 1983
[ Ref . 28: p. 22]. Increased operating costs, more competi-
tion, and lower ticket prices decreased major airline
profits from $ 1. 1 billion in 1978 to only $ 542 million in
1984. 29
To survive an airline must on average be profitable.
But many airlines failed, the most prominent being Brantiff.
A bankrupt airline severely decreases pilot earnings, and
even the threat of bankruptcy drives down pilots' wages.
D. THE POTENTIAL FOR AIRLINE BANKRUPTCIES
Increased competition has decreased the major airlines'
profitability. Following deregulation, only four major
airlines consistently operate with an above-average
profit. 30 The major airlines have struggled to maintain
their market share of passenger travel. Only Republic and
USAIR have improved their market share since 1978 [Ref. 29:
pp. 50-53]. Bankruptcy severely decreases pilots' earnings.
29 1984 profits of $ 800 million adjusted for inflation
and displayed in constant 1978 dollars.
3
"Northwest, Republic, USAIR and Delta normally operate
at a profit level above that of the other major airlines.
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Pilot jobs are completely lost or they suffer substantial
pay cuts. For example, after Continental went bankrupt, its
pilots received a fifty percent pay cut.
Since deregulation the major airlines have struggled to
adapt to a new competitive market environment. Table 27
displays the net operating profits and losses of the major
airlines for 1978, 1983 and 1984. The industry suffered
large losses from 1979 to 1982. 31 Note in Table 27 the
increased profitability of the airlines, such as
Continental, that had obtained wage concessions.
TABLE 27
AIRLINE NET PROFITS AND LOSSES
1978, 1983, 1984
Net Yearly Profit or (Loss) ($ Mil. )
1978 1983 1984
American 97.0 $227.9 233.9
Continental 60.0 (218.4) 50.3
Delta 216.0 ( 13.9) 258.6
Eastern 97.0 (183.7) ( 37.9)
Northwest 68. 50. 1 56.
Pan Am 173.0 ( 58.0) (206.8)
Republic 55.0 (111.0) 29.5
TWA 49.0 12.4 29.9
United 289.0 142.0 282.4
U.S. Air 34.0 80.6 121.6
Western 51.0 (54.5) (29.2)
TOTAL $ 1,189.0 $ (151.3) $ 788.3
Sources: Shearson Lehman Brothers; and
Melvin A. Brenner,
Airline Deregulation ,
ENO Foundation for Transportation,
Westport, Connecticut, 1985.
Note: 1983 losses partially attributed to
economic recession.
31 Increased competition, rising expenses and a severe
recession all contributed to lost airline profits.
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Table 27 shows that American, Delta, Northwest, United,
and USAIR seem to have adapted to the deregulation environ-
ment. Eastern, Pan American, and Western are incurring
losses, adding to their debt and to future problems. While
Eastern and Pan American offer new pilots a high salary
structure, a prospective pilot should question their ability
to pay these high wages in the future. 32 Airlines in finan-
cial trouble seek to lower all costs including wages.
American Airlines is an example of a company which chose to
suffer strikes to gain wage concessions from company pilots.
American is now a profitable and stable employer.
Professors Edward I. Altman and Richard D. Gritta have
developed a regression analysis to predict the ability of an
airline to survive one to five years into the future based
on debt load, profitability, and other factors. Table 28
shows their predictions made for airlines made between 1979
and 1982.
In 1982 nine airlines showed strong predictors of
failure. Two of the largest, Brantiff and Continental, have
gone bankrupt. Their pilots suffered. Continental pilots
who struck receive ALPA union benefits. Those pilots who
remained reportedly receive half of their former salaries. 33
Brantiff pilots began a self-owned airline whose survival is
in doubt. 34
32 Eastern airlines faced bankruptcy in February 1986.
Pilots were agreeable to further wage concessions to protect
their jobs.
33ALPA finances strike benefits by assessing remaining
ALPA union pilots a monthly strike fee. These assessments
are in addition to normal ALPA union dues. Unconfirmed
reports from Continental pilots state that most pilots
received less than half their wages and that these strike
benefits ended in late 1985.
34 Pilots who lose their jobs through airline bankrupt-
cies or pilot lay-offs have some limited relief. The 1978
Deregulation Act provided limited protection for pilots who
lost employment due to increased competition resulting from
the Act. The Act stated that these pilots will be hired by
airlines ahead of new pilot applicants but normally asjunior pilots. However, as of late 1985, no pilot had won




Airline 1982 1981 1980 1979
Northwest + 7. 46 5. 59 5. 16 4 81
Southwest 2. 94 2. 67 1. 45 -6! 31
US AIR 1. 14 -0. 06 -0. 77 -0. 16
Delta 0. 57 2. 78 4. 87 A 30
Frontier -0. 14 1. 31 0. 46 -6. 16
Ozark -0. 59 -0. 97 -3. 07 -3. 36
Piedmont -0. 67 -0. 70 -0. 95 -2. 33
UAL -0. 79 -0. 77 -0. 22 -0. 57
TWA -1. 13 -1. 07 -1. 56 — ] 88
American -1. 45 -1. 42 -1. 78 -o! 67
PSA -1. 81 -1. 67 -2. 42 -l. 55
Eastern -2. 55 -2. 49 -2. 21 -l. 92
World -2. 60 -3. 27 -2. 86
-l. 35
Republic -2. 75 -2. 86 -2. 01 -i 32
Western -3. 85 -3. 57 -2. 21 -6'. 58
Pan American -4. 17 -2. 04 -1. 00 -l. 32
Continental -4. 17 * -3. 10 -4. 37 -4 29
Hawaiian -5. 71 -3. 82 -4. 37 -4. 29
Braniff - 15. 42 -5. 37 -3. i50 -2. 18
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ae year prior to failure
70% 5 years pr ior.
Since pilot wages are shown to be highly correlated with
the pilot's company seniority rather than with his experi-
ence, a change in employers generally will mean a large
decrease in income. An experienced senior pilot from a
bankrupt company will not be employed by another unionized
company in a higher pilot position ahead of the pilots
already employed; instead he will find himself at the bottom
of the salary scale.
Deregulation has another negative affect on pilot pay.
Major airlines lost part of their market share as new
entrants flew former customers. As the major airlines'
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market share decreased, fewer flights and pilots were
required. This resulted in massive lay-offs of junior
pilots. A lay-off will usually result in a severe interrup-
tion of earnings affecting total career income and financial
security. Any airline may find itself facing severe market
competition overnight. These negative affects on airline
earnings will probably continue. Tables 29 and 30 list the
number of pilots without work during 1983 and 1984.
Approximately seven to fourteen percent of unionized pilots
suffered some period of unemployment during this period.
TABLE 29













Airline deregulation eroded major airline profits.
Decreased profits placed downward pressure on pilot wages.
Airlines that suffer continued losses eventually must gain
wage concessions or go bankrupt to compete in the new
market. Only those airlines which have achieved profit-
ability following airline deregulation may have the ability
to maintain above average pilot wages.
With unregulated competition, increased efficiency tends
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Source: Air Li ne Pilot s Association
the United States. Since most airlines have similar costs
for fuel and aircraft 35 and have little leeway to reduce
these costs, wage reductions are the logical way for unpro-
fitable airlines to compete.
As this thesis is being written, Eastern Airlines has
been purchased by Texas Air. Faced by high debt and bank-
ruptcy, Eastern had little choice but to sell. Eastern
pilots, once among the highest paid, had made significant
wagt concessions to save their jobs. Texas Air, known as a
35 Apoendix G lists average fixed cost for flying a
Boeing 747 for one hour in the United States.
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low ticket price airline, will probably seek to lower pilot
wages as it did at Continental Airlines in 1983. Eastern
pilots can anticipate further wage reductions in addition to
the twenty-two percent reductions already agreed to
[ Ref . 30: p. 32].
Texas Air, now owning Continental, Eastern, and New York
Air will become the largest airline in the United States.
Competition on most routes will increase, causing a decrease
in ticket prices. This will place further pressure on Delta
and other airlines to decrease their high pilot labor costs.
Delta, hoping to prevent losses, has stated its desire to
seek lower pilot wages similar to those paid by American
[Ref. 31: p. 127].
Airlines often gain pilot wage reductions by reducing
the wages of newly hired pilots. This protects senior pilot
wages. In this case, new pilots at these two-tiered pays-
cale airlines would never earn the salaries forecast in
Chapter Four.
Airlines currently paying high pilot wages but in finan-
cial difficulty may not be the optimum choice for a new
pilot seeking to maximize his career earnings, because
career interruption will normally result in a permanent pay
reduction.
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VI. AIRLINE PILOT QUALIFICATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
A prime assumption of this thesis is that a Navy pilot
can be hired as a major airline pilot following his twenty
years of military service. In the past this has not always
been true. This section explains how recent developments in
airline hiring practices make it true today.
During the 1970' s the supply of skilled pilots exceeded
demand. Pilot unions kept wages high through skillful
bargaining. High wages increased the supply of qualified
pilots. 36 Airlines used extensive screening policies to hire
only the most qualified pilots. For economic reasons,
airlines increased minimum pilot requirements, effectively
eliminating older military pilots from new pilot jobs.
Because airline pilots require training and certification on
each airliner they fly, regardless of past experience,
pilots' training costs, borne by the airlines, are high.
Pilot training cost, on average, $ 10,000 [ Ref . 32].
Airlines recoup training costs during a pilot's productive
career. The younger a pilot when hired the longer his
potential airline career. Economically, airlines attempted
to hire younger qualified pilots since their training costs
may be recovered over more productive years. Investing in
pilot training for an older pilot was not financially sound
when younger pilots were available. Navy pilots discovered
that they needed to joined an airline soon after their
initial military service obligation, about age thirty, or
they would be too old.
36During the Vietnam era, the military trained thousands
of pilots; however most of these pilots were not hired by
the airlines.
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Airlines also realize that the military is a ready
source of highly trained pilots. The military provides
intensive pilot training and experience in multi-crewed
aircraft. Military flying often simulates airline pilot
duties. Civilian pilots on average lack the marketable
skills of formal flight training and experience in airline
type aircraft. Airlines could realize lower training costs
and lower pilot loss rates by hiring military pilots.
Pilots with military training came to dominate the industry.
At present over half of all new airline pilots are
ex-military pilots.
Since pilot supply exceeded demand, new airline pilot
requirements were stringent. Many were called but few were
chosen. 37 From the 1970' s to early 1980' s, pilots were
required to meet the following qualifications:
1. Age usually less than thirty-two.
2. 20/20 uncorrected eyesight.
3. 2,500 total flight hours, preferably in jet or turbo-
prop aircraft.
4. A college degree.
5. Successful completion of the flight engineers written
exam.
B. CURRENT QUALIFICATIONS
Airline deregulation has increased the demand for
pilots. Over 7,000 new pilots were hired in 1985 [ Ref . 33].
New airlines entering the market, such as People Express,
hired hundreds of pilots, decreasing excess supply. However
as airline expansion increased new pilot demand during the
late 1970' s and early 1980' s the number of new military and
civilian pilots decreased. An economic recession decreased
the number of new civilian pilots who, in a weak economy,
lacked the funds to pay for their training. Traditionally,
37 Pilot interview to hire ratios ranged from 20:1 to
7: 1.
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they had been able to increase their pilot qualifications by
flying for small companies or by instructing flight
students. But during the recession these opportunities
disappeared. also, in 1974, after the U.S. military period
in Vietnam had diminished significantly, the military had
reduced the number of new pilots they trained. This greatly
reduced the number of military pilots available after
1980. 38
As pilot demand exceeded pilot supply, minimum hiring
qualifications for new pilots decreased. Most important for
military pilots is that airlines are now hiring older
pilots. Personnel managers interviewed off the record
attribute this change to the following:
1. The threat posed by age discrimination cases in the
airline and other industries.
2. A shortage of trained pilots relative to demand.
3. The desire to obtain highly trained military pilots.
4. The ability of retired pilots to absorb pay cuts due
to the supplement of military retirement funds.
5. The ability of a military pilot to "fit in" with other
crew members.
Only reasons one and two are legitimate explanations for
airlines' policies of hiring older pilots. Although reasons
three through five were given, they cannot explain the
change because these factors have existed in the past.
Table 31 and Table 32 lists the current range of qualifica-
tions of newly hired airline pilots in 1984 for major and
national airlines.
38 The obligated service for pilot training was 4.5 years
vs. 5 years today.
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C. CONCLUSIONS
Airline deregulation has increased the demand for
highly-trained pilots. Military pilots are desired by
airlines. Since the demand for pilots has increased relative
to supply the minimum hiring standards of major airlines
have decreased.
Personnel managers stressed that when choosing pilots
they expect an older pilot to have more flight experience
than a younger competitor. A retired military pilot will be
expected to have recent flight experience and more flight
hours than a younger pilot to be competitive. This means
that officers not recently piloting aircraft or with low
flight hours may not be competitive for major airline pilot
positions.
No pilot is guaranteed airline employment. However,
evidence suggests that a retired military pilot with good
flight experience will be very competitive for available
pilot positions. Tables 31 and 32 show pilots up to ages
forty-four and fifty-six hired by the major and national
airlines in 1984. 39




1984 MAJOR AIRLINE SUMMARY OF
NEW PILOT QUALIFICATIONS
MAJOR AIRLINES
Total pilots hired in 1984 1088
% of pilots surveyed 41.08 %
Pilot Experience
Multi-engine rating 89. 04 %
Accumulated flight hours 785-9990 hours
Median flight hours 3991. 94
Military flying only 39. 15%
Military and Civilian flying 16. 11%
Total % military hires 55.26%
Medical requirements
Age Range 22-44. 7 years
Median 29. 35 years
Lowest vision required 20/70




1984 NATIONAL AIRLINE SUMMARY OF
NEW PILOT QUALIFICATIONS
Total pilots hired in 1984



























MAJOR AIRLINE MINIMUM PILOTQUALIFICATIONS FOR 1985
Airline Date New Minimums
American Dec 1984 Commercial + Instrument ratings
700 hours multi-engine or jet
High School Graduate
Second Class Medical
United Dec 1984 Commercial +
Instrument ratings




Eastern Feb 1985 1200 total hours; 500 turbine,
200 pilot in command
College Graduate
20/20 vision










Prior chapters developed average career earnings for
airline and Navy pilots. Navy pilots could receive three
distinct salary supplements; ACIP (flight pay) only, ACIP
and installment AOCP, or ACIP and a lump-sum AOCP. Salaries
were computed including and excluding tax benefits derived
from military tax-free income.
This chapter compares career earnings and retirement
benefits from age thirty to: age forty-two when the Navy
pilot may retire and join an airline; sixty when most pilots
retire, and age 77. 6. 4 ° It is assumed that the retired Navy
pilot will fly for a major airline receiving the average
airline salary developed in Chapter Four.
B. AVERAGE AGE MILITARY PILOTS ARE HIRED BY AIRLINES
Since the career-span of an airline pilot is limited, it
is critical to determine the average age ex-military pilots
are hired by the major airlines. This allows total airline
wages for a pilot's remaining working years to be computed.
Most Navy officers begin pilot training following
college at age twenty-two. Flight training takes between
eighteen and twenty- four months. The new pilot assumes a
five-year military obligation at the end of training.
Therefore the earliest a pilot may usually resign is age
twenty-nine, seven years after the start of pilot training.
Few airlines will begin hiring a military pilot until he
has been discharged. From discharge to the beginning of
airline training classes 41 may take a few months to years.
"Sixty is the mandatory retirement age for airline
;. The average life expectanc
'7.6, which ends retirement income.
pilots.
_
. y of a'Navy Officer is
41 Training class dates determine a pilot's seniority
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To determine the average age ex-military pilots are
hired by the major airlines, I averaged the ages of recent
newly hired pilots who had military training. FAPA surveys
new airline pilots reporting the individual's age and mili-
tary experience. Appendix F contains the ages at which
ex-military pilots were hired during 1984 and 1985. To
eliminate the skewing of the average age by including
retired pilots in the data set, I eliminated all officers
over age thirty-eight from the sample. 42 The most common age
(mode) was thirty and the average age was about thirty- two.
Figure 7. 1 shows that most military pilots who join the
airlines do so soon after the end of their service obliga-
tion. Following two years of pilot training and a five year
obligation most pilots will be age thirty as shown in Figure
7. 1 . Age thirty, will be used in this study. Using age
thirty is most relevant because it the lowest age at which
most pilots make an economic decision to join an airline vs.
continue a Navy career.
C. COMPARISON OF PILOT EARNINGS TO MILITARY RETIREMENT AGE
FORTY-TWO
This section compares airline pilot earnings to the
income of a Navy pilot who completes twenty years of mili-
tary service. Wages are for a married officer. Three Navy
salaries from Chapter Two are possible:
1. Pilot receives ACIP but no AOCP 'Bonus' payment.
2. Pilot receives one $ 6,000 AOCP 'Bonus' each year for
six years.
3. Pilot receives one $ 36,000 lump-sum AOCP 'Bonus'
payment.
date for bidding purposes.
42Age thirty-eight was conservatively selected since an
officer may have joined the Navy at age eighteen, gained
promotion to commissioned officer and became a pilot. This




























AVERAGE PILOT AGE = 32. 141
ST. DEV. = YEARS 2.5370
MEDIAN PILOT AGE = 31.800
--142 PILOTS SURVEYED
Source: Compiled by Author from
Piloting Careers
Figure 7. 1 Age Histogram Of
Newly Hired Ex-Military Pilots 1984-1985.
The computed yearly wages are displayed in three groupings.
Navy earnings are compared to the average airline earnings
calculated in Chapter Four and displayed in Table 34 . A
real discount rate of five percent is used to calculate the
present value of the total earnings to the pilot at age
thirty.
1. Navy Pilot Receiving AC IP Only
The yearly salaries of a Navy and an airline pilot
are displayed in Tables 35 and 36 . These Navy pilots do
not receive the additional $ 36,000 AOCP payment but their
incomes still surpass airline pilot earnings. In undis-
counted dollars a Navy pilot earns $ 627,987.90 while the
airline pilot earns $ 524,432.00. A Navy pilot surpasses
total airline earnings by $ 103,555.90 or twenty percent
during the twelve years prior to military retirement. Since
Navy salaries far exceed airline earnings during the early
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TABLE 34
AVERAGE AIRLINE PILOT EARNINGS
AGE THIRTY TO FORTY-TWO
Gross Yearly Earnings
Age AIRLINE 1 NAVY 2













Note 1. 1986 Dollars, 29,075 pilot sample size.
Note 2. Navy pay for officer with four dependents,
receiving installment AOCP and tax benefits.
years, the Navy's present value of earnings of $ 478,772 •
exceeds the airline's $ 384,041 by twenty-five percent.
2. Navy Pilot Receiving ACIP and Installment AOCP
Table 37 shows the yearly salaries of Navy pilots
receiving six $ 6,000 installment AOCP payments. Table 38
has the present value of these salaries. Navy earnings
exceed total airline earnings by $ 134,503 or 26 percent
undiscounted, and by $ 122,238 or 32 percent, discounted.
3. Navy Pilot Receiving ACIP and Lump- Sum AOCP
These pilots have the highest present value earnings
of the three groups since the entire $ 36,000 bonus is
received in the first year. Table 39 displays constant
dollar comparisons while Table 40 has the present values of
Table 39 . The present value of the Navy pilot's $ 509,877
exceeds the airline pilot's income of $ 384,041 by
$ 125,385, or thirty-three percent.
85
4. Summary
In short, a Navy pilot will maximize his earnings by
remaining in the Navy until retirement. Total Navy earnings
exceed those of the average airline pilot during the twelve
years both fly before the Navy pilot's retirement. Airline
yearly earnings surpass Navy earnings between age thirty-
nine and forty. Total Navy earnings in undiscounted dollars
exceed airline earnings by $ 62,573 to $ 132,792, or from
twelve to twenty-five percent. Navy earnings in present
value dollars exceed airline earnings by $ 63,026 to
$ 125,835, or from sixteen to thirty- three percent. Tables
41 and 42 display a summary of the difference in total pay
received in constant and present dollars.
D. COMPARISON OF INCOMES TO AGE SIXTY - AIRLINE RETIREMENT
1. Introduction
This section compares total incomes to final pilot
retirement at age sixty. Two important factors affect total
pay received: the higher yearly earnings of the more senior
of the airline pilots and the Navy pilot's military retire-
ment income of $ 21,094 yearly. 43
The six Navy salaries from age thirty to forty-two
are carried over to begin these comparisons. Tables 43 and
44 display a summary of total pilot pay received in undis-
counted and present value dollars to age sixty.
2. Summary
All Navy pilots' incomes exceed total airline
present value earnings by at least $ 11,196 or one percent.
Those pilots receiving the $ 36,000 AOCP bonus have incomes
that exceed airline earnings by $ 42,301 or four percent.
In undiscounted dollars, over a thirty year career the
4 3Remember that the Navy pilot may retire following
twenty years of military service. He may then fly for an
airline while receiving $ 21,094 in retirement pay yearly.
His total yearly income will be airline pay plus military
retirement pay.
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airline pilot's income surpasses Navy income by from
$ 130,667 to $ 61,241 depending on the bonus received and on
the inclusion or exclusion of military tax advantages.
However, undiscounted dollars are not the appropriate method
of comparison. The present value totals for the Navy pilot
exceed the airline pilot's due to two factors: 44
1. Navy wages exceed airline wages for the first nine to
ten years of their careers.
2. Navy pilots who reach retirement each receive pension
benefits of $ 21,094 yearly starting at age forty-two.
But economic life does not end at retirement. The
next section examines the effect of the combination of
airline and military retirement on a career Navy pilot's
lifetime earnings.
E. COMPARISON OF LIFE-TIME EARNINGS TO AGE SEVENTY-EIGHT
1. Introduction
Since pilots must retire at age sixty, 45 the differ-
ences in retirement incomes of the pilots will determine the
difference in total lifetime incomes from age sixty to
death. A Navy officer has been found to live longer than
his civilian male counter-part. A 45 year-old Navy officer
can expect to live another 32. 6 years to age 77. 6 years,
five years longer than his civilian counter-part [ Ref . 34:
p. 33] . For this study, I assume that airline pilots will
also live this long. Investment, business, and Social
Security incomes are not included in this study. 46 While a
44 Navy pilot's incomes are increased by the receipt of
$ 379,692 in military retirement pay during this period
which offsets the higher earnings of the more senior airline
pilot.
45 Recent court decisions allow captains to downgrade to
third-oilot (flight engineer) at age sixty. Evidence




Both are eligible to receive maximum Social Security
incomes, negating any income differential from Social
Security. Present legal initiatives to tax Social Security
benefits in the future for high-income individuals make
income from Social Security for a retired pilot less
certain. No information is available on individual pilot
87
retired pilot may work following age sixty in another busi-
ness, this study will assume income from military and
retirement sources as the pilot's only source of income.
Military retirement income is one-half of the offi-
cer's final base salary. Retired Commander's pay is $ 21,094
per year in 1986. Military retirement benefits may be
reduced in the future. However it is likely that all
current service members will be grandfathered and continue
to receive current benefits [ Ref . 35].
2. Airline Retirement Benefits
Airline retirement benefits are difficult to esti-
mate accurately. Not all airlines offer retirement
benefits. Those that do usually calculate pay as a
percentage of a pilot's last three years of airline pay.
These percentages vary from thirty to sixty percent. Table
45 lists current major and national airline pension plans.
Thirteen major airlines offer pension benefits.
Airline pilots interviewed state that the determination of
pensions is complex and unique for each pilot. Average
pensions for major airline pilots were calculated by using a
weighted- average of each airline's estimated pension
benefits based on the following assumptions:
1. The pilot will receive the average final salary
computed in Chapter Four and displayed in Tables 46
and 47 .
2. Pay is calculated for the final working year using
seniority of twenty-nine or eighteen years.
3. Pilots will receive the average pension amount for
each airline where a minimum and maximum amount are
listed in Tables 46 and 47 .
To obtain an average airline pension, each company'
s
pension is weighted by the chance each pilot has of being
employed by that airline. This calculation is identical to
the process which calculated the average airline pilot wage
from each individual company's calculated pay scale in
investment or business income.
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Chapter Four. Pilot percentages are displayed again in
Table 48 for reference.
The result of this study is that a pilot who joins
an airline at age thirty will receive an average yearly
pension of $ 52,124. A retired military pilot reaching
eighteen years of airline seniority will receive an average
airline pension of $ 37,691. Combining the airline and
military pensions, the career Navy pilot will receive a
yearly total of $ 58,785 - about $ 6,661 more than an
airline-only career.
F. CONCLUSIONS
A Navy officer who retires and lives to the average age
of 77.6 years will receive $ 780,748 1986 dollars in mili-
tary retirement pay. Combined with an airline pension of
$ 716,090 a total of $ 1,496,607 dollars is received in
retirement funds. His civilian counter-part who joined the
airlines at age thirty receives a total pension income of
$ 990,356, or one-half million dollars less. Since undis-
counted dollar total incomes at age sixty were close, this
large difference in retirement incomes affects the total
earnings between a military or airline career. Tables 49
and 50 present the sum of life-time incomes including
retirement income in undiscounted and present value 1986
dollars.
All Navy pilots' incomes( present values) exceed airline
incomes by three to six percent. Undiscounted dollar
incomes are similar, with Navy incomes exceeding airline
incomes by a maximum of two percent. Career decisions made
earlier in life should include the future retirement value
of the career choice in addition to the immediate monetary
pay of a career. A pilot choosing a military career will
receive a discounted income that matches or exceeds the
income for a pilot choosing an airline career.
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How crucial was the choice of a five percent discount
rate to this comparison? Various discount rates above five
percent were tried. The result was an even greater gain in
the present value of pay for those pilots who chose to stay
in the Navy. The reason is clear. Higher discount rates
give greater weight to short-term differences in pay, and in
the short-term, Navy pay exceeds airline pay. If airline
wages continue to decrease, while Navy pay remains constant
or increases, the comparison will shift further towards a
Navy career.
TABLE 35
UNDISCOUNTED DOLLAR COMPARISON OF EARNINGS
(NAVY PILOT RECEIVES ACIP ONLY)
GROSS ANNUAL EARNINGS
NAVY NAVY
YEARS OF SUM OF PAYS TOTAL WITH AVERAGE
COMPLETED ALLOWANCES AND FEDERAL TAX AIRLINE
SERVICE INCENTIVE PAYS ADVANTAGES SALARY
8 YOS $ 41,566. 92 $ 43,949.93 $ 15, 147
9 YOS 41,566. 92 43,949. 93 28,305
10 YOS 45,843. 48 48,878. 48 31,028
11 YOS 45,843. 48 48,878. 48 34,053
12 YOS 47,578. 68 50,721. 68 37,411
13 YOS 47,578. 68 50,721. 68 41, 140
14 YOS 49,061. 88 52,293. 88 45,280
15 YOS 49,061. 88 52. 293. 88 49,878
16 YOS 54,419. 64 58,094. 64 54,984
17 YOS 54,419. 64 58,094. 64 60,654
18 YOS 56,284. 44 60,055. 36 62,386
19 YOS 56,284. 44 60,055. 36 64, 166
TOTAL $ 589,510. 00 $ 627,987.90 $ 524,432
Source: Computed by author from Appendix A




PRESENT VALUE COMPARISON OF EARNINGS
(NAVY PILOT RECEIVES ACIP ONLY)
GROSS ANNUAL EARNINGS
NAVY NAVY
YEARS OF SUM OF PAYS TOTAL WITH AVERAGE
COMPLETED ALLOWANCES AND FEDERAL TAX AIRLINE
SERVICE INCENTIVE PAYS ADVANTAGES SALARY
8 YOS $ 41,566. 92 $ 43,949.93 $ 15,147. 00
9 YOS 39,587. 54 41,857. 06 26,957. 14
10 YOS 41,581. 38 44,344. 22 28,143. 31
11 YOS 39,601. 32 42,223. 06 29,416. 26
12 YOS 39, 143. 09 41,728. 85 30,778. 12
13 YOS 37,279. 14 39,741. 76 32,234. 26
14 YOS 36,610. 73 39,022. 49 33,788. 63
15 YOS 34,867. 36 37,164. 28 35,447. 36
16 YOS 36,833. 35 39,320. 73 37,215. 33
17 YOS 35,079. 38 37,448. 32 39,098. 10
18 YOS 34,553. 76 36,868. 78 38,299. 59
19 YOS 32,908. 34 35,113. 12 37,516. 53
TOTAL $ 449,612. 30 $ 478,772.60 $ 384,041. 60
Source: Computed by author from Appendix A
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TABLE 3 7
UNDISCOUNTED DOLLAR COMPARISON OF EARNINGS




YEARS OF SUM OF PAYS TOTAL WITH AVERAGE
COMPLETED ALLOWANCES AND FEDERAL TAX AIRLINE
SERVICE INCENTIVE PAYS ADVANTAGES SALARY
8 YOS $ 46,438.92 $ 49,160. 92 $ 15,147
9 YOS 46,438. 92 49,160. 92 28,305
10 YOS 50,715. 48 54,030. 48 31,028
11 YOS 50,715. 48 54,030. 48 34,053
12 YOS 52,450. 68 55,832. 68 37,411
13 YOS 52,450. 68 55,832. 68 41, 140
14 YOS 49,061. 88 52,293. 88 45,280
15 YOS 49,061. 84 52,293. 88 49,878
16 YOS 54,419. 64 58,094. 64 54,984
17 YOS 54,419. 64 58,094. 64 60,654
18 YOS 56,284. 44 60,055. 36 62,386
19 YOS 56,284. 44 60,055. 36 64, 166
TOTAL $ 618,742.00 $ 658,935.90 $ 524,432. 00
Source: Computed by author from Appendix A
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TABLE 38
PRESENT VALUE COMPARISON OF EARNINGS
(NAVY PILOT RECEIVES INSTALLMENT AOCP)
GROSS ANNUAL EARNINGS
NAVY NAVY
YEARS OE SUM OF PAYS TOTAL WITH AVERAGE
COMPLETED ALLOWANCES AND FEDERAL TAX AIRLINE
SERVICE INCENTIVE PAYS ADVANTAGES SALARY
8 YOS $ 46,438.92 $ 49,160.92 $ 15,147. 00
9 YOS 46,428. 45 46,819. 92 26,987. 14
10 YOS 46,000. 43 49,007. 23 28,143. 31
11 YOS 43,809. 93 46,673. 56 29,416. 26
12 YOS 43, 151. 30 45,933. 68 30,788. 12
13 YOS 41,096. 48 43,746. 36 32,234. 26
14 YOS 36,610. 73 39,022. 49 33,788. 63
15 YOS 36,761. 29 37, 164. 28 35,447. 36
16 YOS 36,833. 35 39,320. 73 37,215. 33
17 YOS 35,079. 38 37,448. 32 39,098. 10
18 YOS 34,553. 76 36,868. 78 38,299. 59
19 YOS 32,908. 34 35,113. 12 37,516. 53
TOTAL $ 475,577. 50 $ 506,279.40 $ 384,041. 60
Source: Computed by author from Appendix A
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TABLE 39
UNDISCOUNTED DOLLAR COMPARISON OF EARNINGS




YEARS OF SUM OF PAYS TOTAL WITH AVERAGE
COMPLETED ALLOWANCES AND FEDERAL TAX AIRLINE
SERVICE INCENTIVE PAYS ADVANTAGES SALARY
8 YOS $ 76,438. 92 $ 80, 174. 96 $ 15,147
9 YOS 40,438. 92 42,786. 92 28,305
10 YOS 44,715. 48 47,675. 48 31,028
11 YOS 44,715. 48 47,675. 48 34,053
12 YOS 46,450. 68 49,549. 68 37,411
13 YOS 46,450. 68 49,549. 68 41,140
14 YOS 49,061. 88 52,293. 88 45,280
15 YOS 49,061. 88 55,293. 84 49,878
16 YOS 54,419. 64 58,094. 64 54,984
17 YOS 54,419. 64 58,094. 64 60,654
18 YOS 56,284. 44 60,055. 36 62,386
19 YOS 56,284. 44 60,055. 36 64, 166
TOTAL $ 618,742.00 $ 658,299. 90 $ 524,432
Source: Computed by author from Appendix A
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TABLE 40




YEARS OF SUM OF PAYS TOTAL WITH AVERAGE
COMPLETED ALLOWANCES AND FEDERAL TAX AIRLINE
SERVICE INCENTIVE PAYS ADVANTAGES SALARY
8 YOS $ 76,438. 92 $ 80,174.96 $ 15,147.00
9 YOS 38,513. 25 40,749. 44 26,957. 14
10 YOS 40,588. 25 43,243. 06 28,143. 31
11 YOS 38,626. 91 41, 183. 87 29,416. 26
12 YOS 38,215. 08 40,764. 64 30,778. 12
13 YOS 36,395. 32 38,823. 47 32,234. 26
14 YOS 36,610. 73 39,022. 49 33,788. 63
15 YOS 34,867. 36 37, 164. 28 35,447. 36
16 YOS 36,833. 35 39,320. 73 37,215. 33
17 YOS 35,079. 38 37,448. 32 39,098. 10
18 YOS 34,553. 76 36,868. 78 38,299. 59
19 YOS 32,908. 34 35,113. 12 37,516. 53
TOTAL $ 479,600. 70 $ 509,877.20 $ 384,041. 60
Source: Computed by author from Appendix A
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TABLE 41
UNDISCOUNTED DOLLAR SUMMARY OF EARNINGS

















ACIP $ 589,510. 00 $ 627,987. 90 $ 524,432. 00
INSTALLMENT
AOCP
$ 618,742.00 $ 658,935. 90 $ 524,432. 00
LUMP-SUM $ 618,742.00 $ 658,299. 90 $ 524,432. 00
Source: Author
Note: Lump-Sum total pay with tax benefits
slightly less than installment AOCP
due to differences in tax savings.
TABLE 42
PRESENT VALUE SUMMARY OF EARNINGS




























$ 509,877.20 $ 384,041.60
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TABLE 43
TOTAL CAREER INCOMES IN UNDISCOUNTED DOLLARS














ACIP $ 1,918,972 $ 1,957,450 $ 2,049,639
INSTALLMENT
AOCP
$ 1,948,202 $ 1,988,398 $ 2,049,639
LUMP-SUM
AOCP
$ 1,948,202 $ 1,987,762 $ 2,049,639
Source: Author
Note: Lump-Sum total pay with tax benefits
less than installment AOCP
due to differences in tax savings.
TABLE 44
PRESENT VALUE OF CAREER INCOMES
















ACIP $ 924,308 $ 953,468 $ 942,272
INSTALLMENT $ 950,273
AOCP
$ 980,976 $ 942,272
LUMP-SUM
AOCP






Majors Airlines National Ai rlines
American 60% Airborne Yes




Flying Tigers Note 1 Empire None
Northwest Note 1 Frontier Yes
Pan AM Note 1 Hawaiian Yes
Piedmont Yes Midway None
Republic
TWA




United Note 1 Ozark Yes
USAir Note 1 Peoples Express None











Note 1: retirement pay is a variable
and a function of averaged last




. AIRLINE WAGE AND PENSION BENEFITS
FOR PILOT HIRED AT AGE THIRTY
YEAR OF SERVICE Pension ( Estj.mate)
AIRLINE 29




Flying Tige rs 137,767 41,330 - 82,660
Northwest 158,911 47,697 - 95,394
Pan AM 105,389 31,616 - 63,233
Piedmont 116,110 34,833 - 69,666
Republic 95,605 28,681 - 57,363
TWA 105,599 31,679 - 63,359
United 126,456 37,937 - 75,874
USAir 136,825 41,047 - 82,095
Western 69,440 20,832 - 41,664
Source: Author













YEAR OF SERVICE Pension (Estimate)
AIRLINE 18




Flying Tigers 101,987 30,596 - 61,192
Northwest 107,286 32,186 - 64,372
Pan AM 77,653 23,296 - 46,592
Piedmont 1 89,399 26,820 - 53,639
Republic 78,848 23,654 - 47,308
TWA 70,996 21,299 - 42,598
United 78,847 23,654 - 47,308
USAir 101,772 30,532 - 61,063














) BY THE MAJOR AIRLINES
OF TOTAL PILOTS EMPLOYED
AIRLINE # AIRCRAF1i # Pilots
Airline Percent
of Total Pilots
American 237 3,437 . 118
Continental 90 1,400 . 048
Delta 227 3,773 . 130
Eastern 278 3,475 . 119
Elying Tigers 31 682 . 023
Northwest 109 1,698 . 058
Pan AM 126 1,627 . 056
Piedmont 88 919 . 032
Republic 163 1,616 . 056
TWA 156 2,791 . 096
United 316 4,934 . 170
USAir 124 1,462 . 050
Western 73 1,261 . 043
TOTAL: 29,075 1. 000
Source: ALPA and World Aviation Directo ry.
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TABLE 49
UNDISCOUNTED 1986 DOLLAR LIFETIME INCOMES



























$ 2,982,820 $ 3,022,917 $ 2,967,051
Source: Author
Note: Lump-Sum total pay with tax benefits
slightly less than installment AOCP
due to differences in tax savings.
TABLE 50
TOTAL 1986 PRESENT VALUE LIFETIME

















ACIP $ 1,088,881 $ 1,118,041 $ 1,088, 199
INSTALLMENT $ 1,114,846
AOCP
$ 1,145,548 $ 1,088, 199
LUMP-SUM
AOCP
$ 1,118,869 $ 1,149,684 $ 1,088, 199
Source: Author
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VIII. THE FUTURE OF PILOT PAY IN THE UNITED STATES
Airline executives argue that the equilibrium for a top
pilot pay could be as low as $65,000 in current dollars,
42 % below average pay for ALPA members." [ Ref . 36: p.
This prediction, made in 1984, is approaching reality
today. Chapter Four pointed out that locals of the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA) have accepted wage deferrals or
reductions forty-five times since 1980 [Ref. 37: p. 127].
Also, only the pilots of one airline, Northwest, have
received a pay increase. Airline deregulation removed the
protection from competition that had allowed airlines to
keep prices and wages high.
Economists believe that organizations (airlines) in a
market that becomes competitive will become increasingly
efficient. As efficiency increases, competitors will
decrease the price of their goods and services (ticket
price) to increase their market share and profits. Airlines
will eventually be forced, through competition, to sell
similar airline seats for lower prices. All airlines whose
costs exceed the ticket price will lose money on each
passenger. Airlines will be forced to become more efficient
to compete and survive. Labor costs will be reduced toward
the level reached by the most efficient airline.
We are seeing this process at work, today, in the United
States. Airlines are changing their route structures,
maximizing the use of their aircraft and cutting unnecessary
costs while still providing excellent transportation at
lower prices.
New airlines that enter with much lower labor costs,
such as People Express, have a competitive advantage.
Appendix G shows the average cost of operating a B-747, for
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one flight hour, including the cost of the flight crew. A
large part of airline expenses are fixed. Fuel aircraft, and
taxes cost about the same for all well run airlines. If
ticket prices decrease through competition, labor costs are
one area to reduce for an airline to remain competitive. An
airline paying a captain $ 130,000 plus per year to do the
same job as an airline paying a captain $ 50,000 is clearly
at a competitive disadvantage.
An alternative for an employee wage reduction is for
employees to increase productivity. Pilot productivity has
improved. Pilots fly more passengers on the jumbo aircraft,
increasing productivity by three hundred percent. New
aircraft often require two instead of three pilots
increasing productivity by a third. Pilots could fly more
hours per month; however, for reasons of safety, some upper
limit will probably remain.
Competition also acts to raise the cost of labor. New
airlines have paid their pilots substantially lower wages
then the major airlines. As the national airlines increase
in size, they will begin to compete for the shrinking pool
of available pilots, hence driving up the minimum cost of
pilot labor. In an efficient market, we can expect to see
some stabilization of pilot wages somewhere between the high
wages of the major airlines and the lower wages of the
nationals.
Some experts predict a top future pilot wage of
$ 65,000. If true, how will this fact affect the comparison
of earnings between Navy and airline pilots? Giving some
advantage to the airlines, let us assume that the top wage
will be not $ 65,000 but $ 70,000. Further, let us assume
that the current wages of major airlines will suffer no
further reductions and the present temporary pay reductions
between years one and five will be restored.
104
For reference, the average pilot wages developed in
Chapter Four are displayed in Table 51 . Table 52 displays






Gross Yearly Earnings In 1986 Dollars
YOS YOS
1 $ 15,147 16 $ 71,813
2 28,305 17 73,863
3 31,028 18 75,972
4 34,053 19 78,142
5 37,411 20 80,371
6 41,140 21 82,666
7 45,280 22 85,025
8 49,878 23 87,453
9 54,984 24 89,949
10 60,654 25 92,518
11 62,386 26 95,159
12 64,166 27 97,875
13 65,988 28 100,669
14 67,882 29 103,543






Computed from age thi rty to sixty.
With reduced wages, retirement benefits will be lower.
For this study we will assume that a career airline pilot
with thirty years of service will receive forty-five percent
of his final pay or $ 31,500 per year. His counter-part
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TABLE 52
THIRTY YEAR FUTURE FORECAST OF AIRLINE PILOT
AVERAGE YEARLY EARNINGS
Gross Yearly Earnings In 1986 Dollars
YOS YOS
1 $ 15,147 16 $ 70,000
2 28,305 17 70,000
3 31,028 18 70,000
4 34,053 19 70,000
5 37,411 20 70,000
6 41,140 21 70,000
7 45,280 22 70,000
8 49,878 23 70,000
9 54,984 24 70,000
10 60,654 25 70,000
11 62,386 26 70,000
12 64, 166 27 70,000
13 65,988 28 70,000
14 67,882 29 70,000






Computed from age thirty to sixty.
with eighteen years with the airlines will also receive the
maximum pilot pay of $ 70,000 but receive only $ 21,000 per
year, about thirty percent of his final salary.
The total retirement pay of the two pilots are quite
different. Over a lifetime the Navy pilot will receive
$ 1,120,546 while the airline pilot receives only $ 554,400,
fifty percent less.
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Comparing the total lifetime incomes of the two, and
using the Navy pilot receiving the lump-sum bonus, the Navy
pilot receives $ 2,717,604 with a present value of
$ 1,095,898, compared to the airline pilot's $ 2,332,522 and
$ 947,206 respectfully.
The Navy career exceeds airline career earnings by sixteen
percent in undiscounted and present value dollars.
Even if we assume that Navy pilots of the future will
not receive any AOCP payments, the differences continue to
support a military career. Comparing the total lifetime
incomes of the two, and using the Navy pilot receiving ACIP
only, the Navy pilot receives $ 2,686,656 with a present
value of $ 1,068,391, compared to the airline pilot's
$ 2,332,522 and $ 947,206 respectfully. The Navy career
income exceeds airline career income by fifteen percent in
undiscounted, and thirteen percent in present value dollars.
The result is that as the maximum airline pay decreases,
the advantage of a Navy career increases. The results of
the last chapter showed the present value of a Navy pilot's
lifetime income exceeding airline career income by from
three to six percent. Undiscounted dollar incomes were
roughly equal with Navy income exceeding airline income by a
maximum of two percent. If maximum airline pay decreases to
$ 70,000, incomes will shift substantially in favor of a
Navy career.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The lifetime earnings of Navy pilots who retire prior to
beginning airline pilot careers exceed those of Navy pilots
who begin airline careers before reaching retirement, in
both undiscounted and present value dollars. However, Navy
pilots do not seem aware of this. Most believe they are
financially better off taking airline jobs before reaching
retirement. One reason for this mistaken belief is that
they underestimate their individual military pay. Evidence
suggests they compare net military to maximum gross airline
pay when making a career decision.
The pay of an average major airline pilot does not
exceed the pay of a Navy pilot until he has between nine and
ten years of airline seniority. Airline deregulation has
placed downward pressure on pilots' wages through increased
pricing competition -between airlines. Since 1983, only one
airline has increased pilot wages. Industry experts predict
pilot wages will work towards an industrial norm of $ 65,000
for senior captains.
As airline wages decrease, the economic value of
remaining in the Navy increases. Navy pilots remaining will
benefit from the $ 36,000 maximum AOCP bonus and more impor-
tantly, from an undiscounted lifetime military pension
income of about $ 780,748.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. For Navy Policy
Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) should be
retained. The Navy should also monitor the effect of AOCP
on Navy pilot retention. When airline pilots' wages change,




Navy pilots need to be educated on their true gross
incomes. This thesis' s explanations of average variable
housing allowances (VHA), and average federal tax savings
received by Navy pilots may be used to develop a true
perception of the pay differential between actual Navy and
airline pilot income. This will assist Navy retention
efforts.
If Navy pilots who desire an airline career could
receive increased assurance of airline employment following
retirement, more Navy pilots may elect to serve twenty-year
careers. The Navy should explore the feasibility of
providing refresher pilot training and flying assignments to
pilots prior to their retirement to assist them in obtaining
airline jobs.
The value of military pension income should be
stressed to potential departing officers. They should be
educated on the effect of airline deregulation on civilian
pilot wages and on airline employment stability.
The current Aviation Commanding Officers ' Fact Book
should be updated to reflect the airline pilot wages
reported in this thesis, instead of maximum pilot wage data
available from FAPA.
2. For Future Research
Researchers should explore the effect of airline
bankruptcies in the deregulated market on average major
airline career income.
Researchers should calculate accurate average
airline pension benefits. As airline wages change, future
pension benefits may decline.
The pilot wages available to national and corporate
airline pilots should be compared to Navy pilot earnings.
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APPENDIX A
PAY COMPUTATION TABLES FOR NAVY PILOTS
TABLE 53
TOTAL NAVY MILITARY INCOME
WITH DEPENDENTS & RECEIVING ACIP
Gross Yearly Pay





















































































































Source: Navy I>ay Manual, Autho r
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TABLE 54
TOTAL NAVY MILITARY INCOME
WITH DEPENDENTS & RECEIVING AC IP AND :[NSTALLMENT AOCP
Gross Yearly Pay
Li eutenant 8 YOS Lieutenant 9 YOS
Base Pay $ 27,860. 40 $ 27,860. 40
BAO 5,202. 00 5,202. 00
VHA 2,392. 08 2,392. 08
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 3,672. 00 3,672. 00
AOCP 6,000. 00 6,000. 00
Tax Benefit 2,722. 00 2,722. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 49,160. 92 $ 49,160. 92
LCDR 10 YOS LCDR 12 YOS
Base Pay $ 30,816. 00 $ 32,551. 20
BAO 6,238. 80 6,238. 80
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 3,672. 00 3,672. 00
AOCP 6,000. 00 6,000. 00
Tax Benefit 3,315. 00 3,382. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 54,030. 48 $ 55,832. 68
LCDR 14 YOS LCDR 15 YOS
Base Pay $ 34,034. 40 $ 34,034. 40
BAO 6,238. 80 6,238. 80
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,800. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,232. 00 3,232. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 52,293. 88 $ 52,293. 84
CDR 16 YOS CDR 18 YOS
Base Pay $ 38,725. 20 $ 40,951. 15
BAO 6,825. 60 6,826. 43
VHA 2,756. 40 2,756. 40
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,440. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,675. 00 3,770. 92
YEARLY PAY $ 58,094. 64 $ 60,055. 36
Source: Navy E'ay Manual, Author
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TABLE 55
TOTAL NAVY MILITARY INCOME
WITH DEPENDENTS & RECEIVING ACIP AND LUMP-SUM AOCP
Gross Yearl Y Pa;/
Lieutenant 8 YOS Lieutenant 9 YOS
Base Pay $ 27,860. 40 $ 27,860. 40
BAO 5,202. 00 5,202. 00
VHA 2,392. 08 2,392. 08
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight
AOCP
3,672. 00 3,672. 00
36,000. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,736. 04 2,348. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 80,174. 96 $ 42,786. 92
LCDR 10 YOS LCDR 12 YOS
Base Pay $ 30,816. 00 $ 32,551. 20
BAO 6,238. 80 6,238. 80
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 3,672. 00 3,672. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 2,960. 00 3,099. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 47,675. 48 $ 49,549. 68
LCDR 14 YOS LCDR 15 YOS
Base Pay $ 34,034. 40 $ 34,034. 40
BAO 6,238. 80 6,238. 60
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,800. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,232. 00 3,232. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 52,293. 88 $ 52,293. 88
CDR 16 YOS CDR 18 YOS
Base Pay $ 38,725. 20 $ 40,951. 15
BAO 6,825. 60 6,826. 43
VHA* 2,756. 40 2,756. 40
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,440. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,675. 00 3,770. 92
YEARLY PAY $ 58,094. 64 $ 60,055. 36
Source: Navy I'ay Manual, Authc r
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TABLE 56
TOTAL NAVY MILITARY INCOME
WITHOUT DEPENDENTS & RECEIVING ACIP
Gross Yearly Pay
Lieutenant 8 YOS Lieutenant 9 YOS
Base Pay $ 27,860. 40 $ 27,860. 40
BAO 4,269. 00 4,269. 00
VHS 2,392. 08 2,392. 08
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,800. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 2,867. 00 2,383. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 43,501. 52 $ 43,501. 42
LCDR 10 YOS LCDR 12 YOS
Base Pay $ 30,816. 00 $ 32,551.20
BAO 5,274. 00 5,274. 00
VHA 2,676.24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,800. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,504. 00 3,610. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 48,382. 68 $ 50,223. 88
LCDR 14 YOS LCDR 15 YOS
Base Pay $ 34,034. 40 $ 34,034. 40
BAO 5,274. 00 5,274. 00
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676.24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,800. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,659. 00 3,659. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 51,756. 08 $ 51,721. 08
CDR 16 YOS CDR 18 YOS
Base Pay $ 38,725. 20 $ 40,951. 15
BAO 5,752. 80 5,752. 80
VHA 2,756. 40 2,756. 40
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,440. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 4,100. 57 4,135. 79
YEARLY PAY $ 57,447. 41 $ 59,347. 43
Source: Navy I>ay Manual, Authc>r
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TABLE 57
TOTAL NAVY MILITARY INCOME
WITHOUT DEPENDENTS & RECEIVING INSTALLMENT AOCP
Gross Yearl y PaY
Lieutenant 8 YOS Lieutenant 9 YOS
Base Pay $ 27,860. 40 $ 27,860. 40
BAO 4,269. 00 4,269. 00
VHA 2,392. 08 2,392. 08
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 3,672. 00 3,672. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,091. 00 3,091. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 48,597. 52 $ 48,597. 52
LCDR 10 YOS LCDR 12 YOS
Base Pay $ 30,816. 00 $ 32,551. 20
BAO 5,274. 00 5,274. 00
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 3,672. 00 3,672. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,736. 00 3,812. 60
YEARLY PAY $ 53,486. 68 $ 55,298. 48
LCDR 14 YOS LCDR 15 YOS
Base Pay $ 34,034. 40 $ 34,034. 40
BAO 5,274. 00 5,274. 00
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,800. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,689. 00 3,689. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 51,786. 08 $ 51,786. 08
CDR 16 YOS CDR 18 YOS
Base Pay $ 38,725. 20 $ 40,951. 15
BAO 5,752. 80 5,752. 80
VHA 2,756. 40 2,756. 40
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight
AOCP
4,800. 00 4,440. 00
0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 4,100. 57 4,135. 79
YEARLY PAY $ 57,447. 41 $ 59,347. 43
Source: Navy I'ay Manual, Autho r
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TABLE 58
TOTAL NAVY MILITARY INCOME
WITHOUT DEPENDENTS & RECEIVING LUMP-SUM AOCP
Gross Yearly Pay
Lieutenant 8 YOS Lieutenant 9 YOS
Base Pay $ 27,860. 40 $ 27,860. 40
BAO 4,269. 00 4,269. 00
VHA 2,392. 08 2,392. 08
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 3,672. 00 3,672. 00
AOCP 36,000. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,222. 16 2,840. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 78,728. 68 $ 42,345. 92
LCDR 10 YOS LCDR 12 YOS
Base Pay $ 30,816. 00 $ 32,55*1. 20
BAO 5,274. 00 5,274. 00
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 3,672. 00 3,672. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,452. 00 3,552. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 47,202. 68 $ 49,037. 88
LCDR 14 YOS LCDR 15 YOS
Base Pay $ 34,034. 40 $ 34,034. 40
BAO 5,274. 00 5,274. 00
VHA 2,676. 24 2,676. 24
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,800. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 3,689. 00 3,689. 00
YEARLY PAY $ 51,786. 08 $ 51,786. 08
CDR 16 YOS CDR 18 YOS
Base Pay $ 38,725. 20 $ 40,951. 15
BAO 5,752. 80 5,752. 80
VHA 2,756. 40 2,756. 40
BAS 1,312. 44 1,312. 44
Flight 4,800. 00 4,440. 00
AOCP 0. 00 0. 00
Tax Benefit 4, 100. 57 4, 135. 79
YEARLY PAY $ 57,447. 41 $ 59,347. 43
Source: Navy Pay Manual, Author
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APPENDIX B
MARKOVIAN ANALYSIS OF PILOT PROMOTION PROBABILITIES
The Markovian chain model can be used to predict pilot
promotion rates [ Ref . 42]. The model for this study made
the following assumptions:
1. The structure of a pilot's career is hierarchical.
Positions are clearly defined from high to low.
2. All pilots enter through the lowest position.
3. The airline has a fixed number of pilots.
4. Promotions are from one grade to the next. Grades are
not skipped.
5. Promotions are based on seniority. Pilots are promoted
as more senior pilots are promoted or retire.
6. All pilots are promoted in turn. The wastage rate
(those pilots who leave the airline before retirement)
is zero.
7. All pilots will retire at age sixty.
8. The grade sizes are fixed.
If all assumptions hold, this Markov model can accu-
rately predict the promotion rate of a new pilot over a
thirty year career. A pilot's career is hierarchical. Pilot
positions are clearly defined from high to low. Captains of
the largest, fast aircraft earn the highest hourly salary.
First and second officers each earn a percentage of the
captain's hourly pay. Table 59 lists in descending order the
highest paying pilot positions and hourly pay for a major
airline with a high pilot pay scale.
Since all pilots begin as B-727 second officers, and are
promoted in turn, no pilot can be promoted until a B-747
captain retires at age sixty. This set of conditions creates
a "pull demand" model. When the number of airline pilots,
pilot age, seniority and position of each pilot is initially
known, a pilot's promotion probability to each grade can be
computed. Table 60 gives an example of a Markovian analysis
for one major airline.
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TABLE: 59
HIERARCHY OF PILOT POSITIONS AND REPRESENTATIVE PAY
Gross Pay per Hour
B-747 Captain $ 169. 63
DC-10 Captain 168. 78
B-727 Captain 162. 64
B-747 First Officer 161. 79
DC-10 First Officer 152. 91
B-747 Second Officer 142. 98
DC-10 Second Officer 131. 61
B-727 First Officer 127. 31
B-727 Second Officer 122. 93
Source: 1985 airline union contract
TABLE 60
MARKOV IAN PREDICTION OF PILOT PROMOTIONS
Year Crew Position Aircraft
1 Second Officer B-727
5 First Officer B-727
10 Second Officer DC-10
13 Second Officer B-747
16 First Officer DC-10








However, since airline deregulation, the size of
airlines along with the number of employed pilots has widely
fluctuated. Contracting airlines demote pilots to lower
paying positions. Expanding airlines offer more rapid
promotions. For this reason, Markovian analysis was able to
predict promotion rates only in the short term while airline
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size was somewhat constant. The more rapid the airline





RANGE OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Pilot Airline Salaries 1984-1985
SUMMARY OF ACTUAL PILOT WAGES REGRESSION ANALYSIS
FROM ALPA DATA





























43, 908 + 3 308 ( YOS
28 068 + 2 670 < YOS
50 111 + 2 882 1 YOS
25 585 + 3 807 1 YOS
34 291 + 2 409 |'YOS
44 039 + 2 520 < YOS
61 443 + 1 740 | YOS
17 194 + 2 989 < YOS
9 169 + 3 871 < YOS
42 336 3 302 I YOS




















30. 8- 4. 5
31. 6- 6. 1
31. 5- 6.
31. 5- 6. 3






Note 1: ALPA data not available on these airlines.
Note 2: (YOS) is completed years of service with the
airline. A probationary pilot has zero YOS.
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APPENDIX D









55 and under 60 121
60 and under 65 475
65 and under 70 573
70 and under 75 3274
75 and under 80 5624
80 and under 85 744
85 and under 90 144
ALL First Officers 9,951
With Credited
Flight Hours of:
50 and under 55 57
55 and under 60 55
60 and under 65 513
65 and under 70 572
70 and under 75 3108
75 and under 80 4628
80 and under 85 655
85 and under 90 139
90 and over 44
ALL Second Officers 7,708
With Credited
Flight Hours of:
50 and under 55 52
55 and under 60 88
60 and under 65 722
65 and under 70 498
70 and under 75 2449
75 and under 80 3377
80 and under 85 296
85 and under 90 60
90 and over 12
Source: Industrial Wage Survey: Scheduled Airlines,
U. S. Department of Labor 1977











50 and under 55
55 and under 60
60 and under 65
65 and under 70
70 and under 75
75 and under 80
80 and under 85









ALL First Officers 12,435
With Credited
Flight Hours of:
50 and under 55 104
55 and under 60 118
60 and under 65 424
65 and under 70 653
70 and under 75 3479
75 and under 80 4914
80 and under 85
85 and under 90
90 and over
ALL Second Officers 8,606
With Credited
Flight Hours of:
50 and under 55 115
55 and under 60
60 and under 65
65 and under 70 442
70 and under 75 2854
75 and under 80 3828
80 and under 85
85 and under 90
90 and over
Source: Industrial Wage Survey: Certified Air Carriers,
September 1980, U. S. Department of Labor June 1982











40 and under 45 52
45 and under 50 68
50 and under 55 180
55 and under 60 218
60 and under 65 424
65 and under 70 428
70 and under 75 1224
75 and under 80 6268
80 and under 85 3129
85 and under 90
ALL First Officers 14,025
With Credited
Flight Hours of:
4o and under 50 91
50 and under 55 177
55 and under 60 160
60 and under 65 367
65 and under 70 487
70 and under 75 1264
75 and under 80 5944
80 and under 85 2919
85 and under 90
90 and over
ALL Second Officers 7,806
With Credited
Flight Hours of:
50 and under 55 102
55 and under 60 192
60 and under 65 165
65 and under 70 303
70 and under 75 914
75 and under 80 4352
80 and under 85 962
85 and under 90 355
90 and over
Source: Industrial Wage Survey: Certified Air Carriers,
June 1984, U. S. Department of Labor, August 1985




SUMMARY OF POST- 1983 MAJOR AIRLINE WAGE CHANGES
American's two-tiered pilot structure allows American to
hire new pilots at 50 % less than current levels after 1986
[Ref. 67: p. 27].
American Airlines Inc. won the right in late 1983 to hire
new pilots at from 30 % to 50 % below old pay rates and to
keep pay levels down. A 12th year captain with American
will now earn $ 65,000 per year compared to a top rate of $
150,000 for a senior captain now [Ref. 59: p. 127J .
At American Airlines, a DC-10 pilot with top seniority can
now make $ 127,900 a year. The lower tier pay scale is
designed so that a newly hired pilot will earn only about
half as much flying the same plane, no matter how many years
he flys. American has hired 372 new pilots on the new pay
scale with 3,700 pilots remaining on the old pay scale
[Ref. 45 : pp. 82-84] .
American won the right to hire new pilots at 50 % of current
pilot pay rates in return for the costly promise of lifetime
employment for current pilots at the older, high wage rates
[Ref. 46: p. 41].
Twenty-five percent of striking Continental pilots have
returned to work. Striking pilots are receiving $ 2,400 per
month from their union [Ref. 47].
Continental is paying their top pilots $ 45,000 after abro-
gating pilot contracts [Ref. 44: p. 127].
Eastern pilots agreed to a two-year settlement. Pilots will
receive a 17. 5 percent pay increase to be taken in the form
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of subordinated debentures paying 5 percent interest.
Monthly flight time increased from 80 to 85 hours [ Ref . 49].
Eastern unions filed suit over Easterns extension of wage
concessions of 22 % pay cuts for pilots agreed to in late
1983. Pilots agreed to the 22 % wage cuts in return for 12
million shares of common stock worth 25 % of the airline.
Frank Borman, Easterns president, told employees December
31, 1984 that the wage concessions would continue but that
the stock plan would be eliminated until, union negotiations
are completed. Union leaders called the action a
"betrayal. " Eastern pilots agreed to a 22 % pay cut in late
1983 in exchange for 12 million shares in common stock worth
25 % of the airline [Ref. 50: p. 32].
Eastern told its unions to accept a 15 % wage cut or face a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy similar to Continental on October 13,
1983 [Ref. 51: p. 128] .
Delta Air Lines Inc. is moving to match the pilot pay-cuts
won by American [Ref. 48: p. 127].
Airline executives argue that the equilibrium for a top
pilot pay could be as low as $65,000 in current dollars, 42
% below average pay for ALPA members [Ref. 52: p. 127].
Northwest Orient pilots agreed to a pay freeze until January
1, 1984 and increased flying hours from 75 to 83 hours
maximum oer month. Pilots will receive a raise of 7. 5
percent at the end of the freeze and 6. 5 percent in 1985
[Ref. 54].
Pan Am pilots have delayed pay raises of up to eighteen
percent during the present contract. These raises are due
January 1, 1985. Pan Am pilots have agreed to stretch out
over thirty-two months the twenty-six percent increase due
them on January 1, 1985. Pilots, however, struck in March,
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1985 over Pan Am's offer of a twenty percent pay raise over
three years [ Ref . 55: p. 35].
Pan American pilots accepted givebacks twice since 1981.
Management now wants to reduce its 1984 $850 million dollar
labor bill by $250 million [Ref. 56: p. 30].
Pan Am pilots new contract stretches out pay hikes due last
Jan 1 and guarantees productivity increases to offset the
added costs of the contract [Ref. 57: p. 39].
Piedmont has a two-tiered pay system. Second-tier officers
are paid 28% less the first-tier officers until the third
year the pilot is a captain. Piedmont pilots are making
captain in four years so this amounts to a seven-year pay
reduction [Ref. 64: p. 79].
Piedmont Airlines agreed to a two-tiered wage system for new
pilots. New pilots will receive less than the pilots pres-
ently on the payroll. Effective retroactive to April 1,
1984. Locals of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) have
accepted wage deferrals or reductions 45 times since 1980
[Ref. 53: p. 127].
Republic Airlines pilots agreed to an extension of a 15
percent pay cut instituted in November, 1983. The cut will
be extended through 1986 [Ref. 60].
Republic pilots second-officers are paid 10% below current
rates for the first three years, with parity after four
years [ Ref. 58: p. 79]
.
Republic Airlines reduced pilot pay 15 % effective September
1, 1983 [Ref. 43 : p. 29] .
United negotiators agreed on a new two-tiered pay system.
Starting salaries for new pilot hires will be between 34 to
50 % of the current pay scale for a five-year period.
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Permanent new-hire rates will be set within the next five
years based on a review of the records of the three largest
competitors. United sets wages for second officers after
the first year at 19% below normal rates for B-747 second
officers, 7-9% lower for DC-10 second officers and 3% lower
for DC-8 and B-767 second officers. The contract allows for
parity [ Ref. 61: p. 79]
.
United 5,000 striking pilots ended a strike over a two-
tiered pay system. The new pay system will pay new pilots
at rates between 34 % and 50 % of the current scale for a
five-year period. After five years, a permanent pay scale
will be devised after examining the records of the top five
competitors [Ref. 63: p. 79].
Western pilots agreeded to a 18% pay cut in November, 1983.
The new contract makes the 18% cut permanent and includes
another 12. 5% cut. It includes a 30% increase in produc-
tivity and a 3% reduction in retirement benefits [Ref. 65:
p. 39].
Western pilots agreed to a 10 % pay cut until Sept. 30, 1984
and defer an 8 % pay raise [Ref. 66 : p. 32].
This Western pay reduction included a stock ownership plan
representing 32 % of the company's total stock [Ref. 62 : p.
29] .
An independent arbitrator issued a decision in July, 1984,
extending the pay cuts of Western's 1,200 pilots in addition
to a further 12. 5 % wage cut and a 26 % productivity
improvement [ Ref. 68 : p. 30]
.
A Federal court upheld a ruling that Western violated the
Age Discrimination Act by imposing a mandatory retirement
age of 60 on flight engineers and by refusing to allow DC-10
pilots nearing the Federal Aviation Administrations required
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retirement age of 60 for pilots to "bid down'' on flight
engineers jobs. There are 200 flight engineers over age 50




AGES OF EX-MILITARY NEW HIRE AIRLINE PILOTS
TABLE 65
AGES OF EX-MILITARY NEW HIRE CIVILIAN
AIRLINE ]PILOTS 1984
Jan-Feb Apr June July Auq Oct
29. 5 28. 4 28. 1 28. 1 27. 1 28. 5
30. 29. 1 29. 1 28. 5 28. 28. 8
30. 1 29. 6 29. 5 28. 7 28. 8 29.
32. 9 30. 1 29. 7 29. 1 28. 9 29.
32. 9 31. 1 30. 4 29. 1 29. 5 29. 1
33. 2 31. 5 32. 4 30. 1 29. 5 29. 3
34. 2 31. 5 33. 30. 4 29. 6 29. 7
39. 7 34. 3 33. 1 30. 5 30. 6 30. 2
34. 31. 1 31. 1 30. 6
34. 1 31. 6 32. 31. 9
34. 8 33. 4 32. 2 32. 1
36. 9 33. 8 36. 3 32. 1













Average Age 1 31 345 years
Standiard Deviation 2 576 years
Maximum Age 37 3
Minimum Age 27 1
Source: Pilotina Careers




AGES OF EX--MILITARY NEW HIRE CIVILIAN
AIRLINE PILOTS 1985
Jan Feb May June July Aug
29 28 28. 1 28. 7 28. 6 27. 9
29 28 29. 7 29. 6 29. 9 28. 1
30 28. 6 29. 9 29. 7 30. 4 28. 5
30 28. 6 30. 2 29. 9 31. 4 29. 2
30 28. 7 30. 3 30. 2 32. 4 29. 1
30 29 30. 8 30. 6 34. 29. 9
30 29. 32. 31. 4 36. 4 30.
31 30. 32. 2 31. 4 38. 5 30. 1
31 30. 32. 2 31. 7 38. 6 30. 5
31 30. 33. 5 31. 9 31. 6
32 31 33. 7 32. 8 32. 2
32 32. 38. 1 32. 8 33.
33. 6 32. 4 38. 5 33. 1 33. 2
34 32. 5 40. 5 33. 4 37. 1
34 32. 7 41. 3 34. 2 37. 5
34. 1 32. 9 35. 9 37. 8
37 33 36. 38. 8









ation 2. 579 years
Maximum Age 37. 8
Minimum Age 27. 9
Source: Pilotincr Careers









Crew costs $ 728. 63









Sub-total $ 382. 69
Depreciation $ 395. 53
Amortization 152. 57
Rentals 84. 04
TOTAL $ 4,708. 68
Source: 1985 World Aviation Directory
Note: Costs are average per block hour flown by






Crew costs $ 455. 80




Sub-total $ 1,488. 97
Maintenance
Airframes $ 63. 32
Engines 44. 02
Other 11. 53
Sub-total $ 118. 87
Depreciation $ 151. 42
Amortization 35. 77
Rentals 21. 54
TOTAL $ 1,846. 23
Source: 1985 World Aviation Directorv
Note: Costs are average per block hour flown by












FEDERAL EXPRESS NOTE 1
FLYING TIGERS NOTE 1
NORTHWEST NOTE 1







Source: FAPA 1985 PILOT SALARY SURVEY
NOTE 1: RETIREMENT PAY IS A VARIABLE
AND A FUNCTION OF AVERAGED LAST










Air Cal Yes Yes
Air Florida Not Av Bankrupt
Alaska Yes Yes
Aloha 32 % Yes






Midway Express None Not Avail.
New York Air 24% 24%
Ozark Yes Yes
Peoples Express None None
PSA Yes Yes
Southwest Yes Yes
Trans Am Yes Yes
Wien Yes Yes
World Yes Yes
Source: FAPA 1985 Pilot !
Note 1: Retirement pay is





-- 30 % to 60 %.
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APPENDIX I
AVERAGE PILOT SENIORITY 1983 BY EQUIPMENT AND POSITION
Major Airlines ALPA ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP
Equipment Aver age Age Pilots Seniority
B-707 Cap 57. 54 13 28. 8
F/O 47. 50 8 18. 1
S/O 46. 59 14 19. 3
B-727 Cap 48. 52 3,265 21. 9
F/O 42. 51 3,082 14. 8
S/O 37. 96 2,766 9. 7
B-737 Cap 46. 81 465 19. 7
F/O 42. 41 485 14. 6
S/O 34. 18 17 6.
B-747 Cap 54. 79 632 28. 9
F/O 47. 77 685 19. 7
S/O 57. 01 354 30. 3
B-757 Cap 51. 00 81 25. 4
F/O 42. 96 73 16. 5
S/O 44. 00 3 15. 7
B-767 Cap 51. 77 35 26. 2
F/O 44. 64 252 17. 3
S/O 48. 00 1 16.
CV-580 Cap 32. 70 70 5. 8
F/O 31. 83 6 4. 7
DC-8 Cap 52. 11 265 26. 3
F/O 44. 96 301 16. 7
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S/0 39. 90 225 11. 8
DC-9 Cap 47. 28 1,781 20. 4
F/0 36. 9 1,650 9. 2
S/0 30. 50 2 1. 5
DC-10 Cap 55. 06 500 29. 3
F/0 46. 02 442 18.
S/0 47. 02 363 17. 8
BAC-111 Cap 45. 58 139 18. 3
F/0 33. 63 104 4. 1
L-1011 Cap 54. 35 715 28. 7
F/0 44. 65 594 17. 6
S/0 42. 09 574 14. 6
A-300 Cap 54. 83 195 28. 7
F/0 44. 97 166 17. 7
S/0 39. 67 1539 11. 9
M-298 Cap 45. 23 103 19. 3
F/0 33. 02 92 4. 2
AVERAGES
Cap 49. 03 10,895 22. 4
F/0 41. 5 10,240 13. 4
S/0 40. 72 5,576 12. 4
Source: ALPA 1983 Wage Survey
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APPENDIX J
UNITED STATES INCOME LEVELS
TABLE 71
MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS 1985














Source: Department of Labor
TABLE 72
CENSUS FIGURES FOR INCOME
Wages as of March 1983
Earnings > $ 64,000 in top five percent of U.S.
Earnings > $ 39,492 in top twenty percent of U.S.
Source "Earnings by Occupation and Education"
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Burea of the Census,
Vol. 2, May 1984 pp. 3 - 485.
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TABLE 73
CENSUS FIGURES FOR INCOME
Household Income March 1981
$ 35,000 to 49,999 10.3 percent of U.S. households
$ 50,000 to 74,999 4.1 percent of U.S. households
$ 75,000 up 1.3 percent of U. S households
Expected life-time earnings for a male
college graduate age 35 in 1981 dollars $ 956,000
Source: "Earnings by Occupation and Education"
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Burea of the Census,
Vol. 2, May 1984 pp. 3 - 485.
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APPENDIX K
AIRLINE POINTS OF CONTACT
Mr. Gerald L. Andrews
Flight Agreements Manager
United Airlines
P. 0. Box 66100
Chicago, Illinois 60666
Mr. R. G. Caldwell
V. P. Personnel Administration
Delta Airlines Inc.
Hartsfield - Atlanta International Airport
Atlanta, Ga. 30320
Mr. Joseph W. Ettel













DFW Airport, Tx. 75261 - 9616











Winston - Salem NC. 27156
Mr. Dennis A. Newgren
Labor Relations Representative
Northwest Orient
Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport
St. Paul, Minnesota 55111
Mr. Edward Proctor






Staff Vice President Personnel
Trans World Airways
605 Third Ave.
New York, New York 10158
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